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NOTES 
Disclosure of Grand Jury Materials Under Clayton Act 
. Section 4F(b) 
Congress enacted the parens patriae provisions of the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 19761 to provide an adequate 
remedy for consumers injured by antitrust violations, and to ensure 
that violators do not go scot-free merely because each consumer's 
injury is too small to make litigation worthwhile.2 The parens pa-
triae provisions authorize state attorneys general to bring treble 
damage suits on behalf of all state residents injured by antitrust vio-
lations. 3 Section 4F(b) of the Act assists state attorneys general in 
the prosecution of such suits by requiring that the United States At-
torney General honor, "to the extent permitted by law," their re-
quests for "any investigative files or other materials" that may be 
relevant to a state's cause of action under the Clayton Act.4 
I. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1394 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (1976)). 
2. H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-8 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CooE CONG, 
& Ao. NEWS 2572-78 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976). Parens patriae suits were intended to compensate the victims of 
antitrust violations, prevent violators from being unjustly enriched, and deter future violations. 
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 2572. Ac-
cord, 122 CONG. REC. 7036 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Daniels); 122 CONG. REC, 7026 (1976) 
(letter from Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division). They have 
met with limited success. See Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: Tile 
Fallacy of Parens Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626, 635 (1976) (at-
tacking many of the assumptions upon whichparens patriae provisions rest and suggesting that 
parens patriae suits are inadequate both as a deterrent and as a compensatory remedy). 
There have been relatively few parens patriae suits to date, both because state attorneys 
general are constrained by limited enforcement resources, see Hill, The Present and Future 
Status of Parens Patriae Litigations from the Plaintiff's Viewpoint, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 1375, 
1376-78 (1979), and because the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 
U.S. 720 (1977), presents an imposing obstacle to state parens patriae litigation. In Illinois 
Brick, the Court held that consumers who purchase from middlemen may not rely on "passing 
on" theories to recover damages from manufacturers who violated the antitrust laws. Some 
argue that Illinois Brick has virtually nullified the Hart-Scott-Rodino Actparens patriae provi-
sions because it suggests that even a parens patriae action could only be brought on behalf of 
direct consumers. See Newman, Limiting the Antitrust .Damage Suit: The Emergence of a Pol-
icy Against Complex Litigation, 23 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 253, 270-72 (1977); Reviving State Eeforce-
ment: The Problems with Putting New Wine in Old Wine Skins, 4 J. CORP. L. 547, 585 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Reviving State Eeforcement]. One commentator predicts that even if Con• 
gress passes a statute reversing Illinois Brick, there will never be a flood of parens patriae 
litigation. Hill, supra, at 1380. 
4. In full, § 4F provides: 
(a) Whenever the Attorney General of the United States has brought an action under 
the antitrust laws, and he has reason to believe that any State attorney general would be 
entitled to bring an action under this Act based substantially on the same alleged violation 
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Pursuant to section 4F(b), state attorneys general have requested 
grand jury materials5 from the United States Attorney General to 
expedite discovery in civil parens patriae suits. 6 Such requests are 
not surprising. Federal grand jury proceedings generate a wealth of 
documents and testimony.7 Because civil antitrust actions are fre-
quently based upon the same facts and allegations as those investi-
gated by federal grand juries, the information produced in the grand 
jury investigation is often directly relevant to the civil action. Al-
though examination of documents subpoenaed by federal grand ju-
ries "will not in and of itself solve the problem of establishing 
liability," these documents may provide plaintiffs with a "shortcut to 
what may be the heart of the documentary evidence."8 In fact, 
grand jury transcripts have been described as "clearly the single 
most valuable aid in discovering and assessing the facts relating to 
the merits of an antitrust claim."9 
of the antitrust laws, he shall promptly give written notification thereof to such State attor-
ney general. 
(6) To assist a State attorney general in evaluating the notice or in bringing an action 
under this Act, the Attorney General of the United States shall, upon request by such 
State attorney general, make available to him, to the extent permitted by law, any investi-
gative files or other materials which are or may be relevant or material to the actual or 
potential cause of action under this Act. 
15 U.S.C. § 15f (1976). State attorneys general have invoked§ 4F(b) on a number of occa-
sions, see Reviving State E,yorcement, supra note 3, at 596 n.505, and the section has begun to 
attract the attention oflegal commentators. See Maximov, Accers by State Allomeys General to 
Federal Grand Jury Antitrust Invertigative Materials, 69 CAL. L. REv. 821-(1981); Note, .Disclo-
sure of Grand Jury Materials in Parens Patriae Actions, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 410 (1981). Several 
articles treat the section briefly. See Kintner, Griffin & Goldston, The Hart-Seo/I-Rodino Anti-
trust Improvements Act of 1976: An Analysis, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1977); Rubin & 
Malet, State Initiatives in Antitrust Invertigation, 4 J. CORP. L. 513, 525-26 (1979); Symposium, 
Parens Patriae Suits by State Allorney Generals: An Effective Antitrust Remedy far Small Busi-
nerses, 13 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 649, 669 n.96 (1980); Reviving State Enforcement, supra note 3, 
at 595-96; Note, The Use of Grand Jury Transcripts in Private Antitrust Litigation: An Argument 
far Automatic Accers, TEXAS L. REv. 647, 660-62 (1980). 
5. Grand jury materials include documents, subpoenaed.information concerning the iden-
tity of persons called to testify, and the transcript of the proceedings. 
6. Although Congress enacted § 4F(b) for the express purpose of aiding the prosecution of 
state parens patriae suits, the language of§ 4F(b) allows access for other state civil actions as 
well. See note 4 supra. State governments frequently initiate civil antitrust actions. See 
Miles, Current Trends in State Antitrust E,yorcement, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 1343, 1344-45, 1366 
(1976). A state may sue to recover damages sustained in its proprietary capacity, see, e.g., 
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943); 
Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942); Illinois v. Bristol-Myers Co., 470 F.2d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 
1972); 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1976), or on behalf of state residents injured by antitrust violations. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976). See generally Reviving State E,yorcement, supra note 3, at 549; 
[1980) ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 979, D-5. 
7. This explains why private plaintiffs are seeking access to grand jury materials with in-
creasing regularity. See Unikel, .Discovery of Grand Jury Transcripts in Civil Antitrust Cases in 
tlze Seventh Circuit: Fair Use or Abuse?, 66 ILL. B.J. 706, 706 (1978). 
8. Korman, The Antitrust Plaint!lf" Following in tlze Government's Footsteps, 16 VILL. L. 
REV. 57, 72 (1970). Accord, ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, HANDBOOK ON ANTITRUST GRAND 
JURY INVESTIGATIONS 43 (1978) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. 
9. K:urJand, .Discovery: Its Uses and Abuser - The Plaint!lf"'s Perspective, 44 ANTITRUST 
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This "most valuable aid," however, may be denied to state attor-
neys general by rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.10 Rule 6( e )(2) codifies the traditional rule of grand jury 
secrecy, 11 and rule 6( e )(3) provides an exhaustive list of exceptions, 
none of which permits disclosure by the Attorney General to state 
attorneys general to aid civil-law enforcement.12 Only rule 
L.J. 3, 5 (1975). Improved access to federal grand jury materials would enable civil plaintiffs 
to cut expenses by avoiding duplicative document requests and searches, interrogatories, and 
depositions. National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, Staff 
Papers: Procedural Revisions, Previously .Discovered Material, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1085, 1093 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Previously .Discovered Material]. In the absence of disclosure, the 
cost of duplicative discovery may discourage valid private suits that otherwise would be 
brought in the wake of a government prosecution. See The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975: 
Hearings on S. 1284 Before the Subcomm on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary 
Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 399 (testimony of M. Silbergeld) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust 
Improvements Act Hearings]; Korman, supra note 8. 
10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). The relevant sections of rule 6(e) state: 
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. -A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator 
of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorneY, for the 
government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(1i) of this 
subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise 
provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person 
except in accordance with this rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a 
contempt of court. 
(3) Exceptions. 
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand 
jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be made to -
(i) an attorney for the government for use hi the performance of such attorney's duty; 
and 
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the govern-
ment to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's 
duty to enforce federal criminal law. 
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii) of this para-
graph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other than assisting the 
attorney far the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal 
criminal law. An attorney for the government shall promptly provide the district court, 
before which was impaneled the grand jury whose materials has been so disclosed, with 
the names of the persons to whom such disclosure has been made. 
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand 
jury may also be made -
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial pro-
ceeding; or 
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that 
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring 
before the grand jury. 
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure 
shall be made in such a manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the court may 
direct. 
This rule has the force and effect of law. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1976). See Illinois Petition v. 
Widmar, (1980-81] Trade Cas. 78,103 (N.D. Ill. 1981); United States v. Sherwood, 38 F.R.D. 
14, 20 (D. Conn. 1964). 
11. Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R 94 Before the Subcomm on Immigration, Citizen-
ship and International Law of the House Judiciary Comm, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 57-75 
(1977) (statement of Prof. John A. Scott) (hereinafter cited as Grand Jury Reform Hearings]; 
Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REv. 455,457 (1965); Kaufman, The Grand Jury-
Its Role and Its Powers, 17 F.R.D. 331 (1954); Comment, The Propriety of a Breach of Grand 
Jury Secrecy When No Indictment is Returned, 6 Hous. L. REv. 341, 342-44 (1970). 
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3). 
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6(e)(3)(C)(i), which permits disclosure "when so directed by a court 
preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding," allows 
disclosure to state attorneys general for use in civil suits. 13 Although 
rule 6( e) establishes no standards governing release under this excep-
tion, the Supreme Court has long held that courts may grant access 
to grand jury materials only upon a showing of "particularized 
need" by the requesting party.14 Under the "particularized need" 
standard, courts cannot release grand jury materials to state attor-
neys general merely to expedite civil discovery, even when such 
materials would greatly facilitate state civil antitrust actions. 15 
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i). Rule 6(e)(3)'s exceptions permit disclosure in three 
other circumstances. First, otherwise prohibited disclosure may be made to an "attorney for 
the government" for use in the performance of that attorney's duty. FED. R. CRIM. P. 
6(e)(3)(A)(i). Federal Rule of Crinlinal Procedure 54(c) defines an "attorney for the govern-
ment" as "the Attorney General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a United 
States Attorney, an authorized assistant of a United States Attorney and when applicable to 
cases arising under the laws of Guam means the Attorney General of Guam or such other 
person or persons as may be authorized by the laws of Guam to act therein." The phrase does 
not include attorneys for state and local governments. Special Feb. 1971 Grand Jury v. Con-
lisk, 490 F.2d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1973); In re Holovachka, 317 F.2d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 1963); In 
re 1979 Grand Jury Proceedings, 479 F. Supp. 93, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Miami Fed. 
Grand Jury No. 79-8, 478 F. Supp. 490, 492 (S.D. Fla. 1979); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 
445 F. Supp. 349, 350 (D.R.I. 1978); Corona Constr. Co. v. Ampress Brick Co., 376 F. Supp. 
598 (N.D. ill. 1974); United States v. Downey, 195 F. Supp. 581, 584 (S.D. ill. 1961); 1 C. 
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 107, at 177 (1969). Thus, the "attorney for the government" exception does not authorize 
disclosure of federal grand jury materials to state attorneys general. 
Second, rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) permits disclosure of grand jury materials to persons deemed 
necessary to assist "attorneys for the government" in the enforcement of the federal criminal 
laws. Finally, rule 6(e)(3)(C)(ii) authorizes courts to disclose grand jury materials to defen-
dants in a crinlinal case upon a finding that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the 
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. 
14. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979); Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 
U.S. 677 (1958). In Procter & Gamble, the Court held that the requesting party must show 
compelling necessity to obtain disclosure. 365 U.S. at 681-82. In .Douglas Oil, the Court fur-
ther developed the "particuJarized need" standard, finding that parties seeking disclosure must 
demonstrate that (I) the material "is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial 
proceeding;" (2) the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy; and 
(3) their request is structured to cover only materials so needed. 441 U.S. at 222. 
15. The need to reduce the cost and delay of civil discovery is not sufficiently particular-
ized to warrant disclosure of grand jury materials. Writing for the Court in United States v. 
Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), Mr. Justice Douglas explained: 
The relevancy and usefulness of the testimony sought were, of course, sufficiently estab-
lished. If the grand jury transcript were made available, discovery through depositions, 
which might involve delay and substantial costs, would be avoided. Yet these showings 
fall short of proof that without the transcript a defense would be greatly prejudiced or that 
without reference to it an injustice would be done. 
356 U.S. at 682. 
Lower courts have consistently followed the Supreme Court's holding in Procter & Gamble. 
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, Sept. 20, 21, 22, and 25, 1967, 82 F.R.D. 70 (N.D. W. Va. 1979); 
Corona Constr. Co. v. Ampress Brick Co., 376 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Ill. 1974); ABC Great 
Stores, Inc. v. Globe Ticket Co., 309 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Hancock Bros., Inc. v. 
Jones, 293 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 
559 (D. Minn. 1968); United States v. American Optical Co., [1965] Trade Cas. 80,705 (E.D. 
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Courts disagree as to whether section 4F(b) alter~d rule 6(e)'s se-
crecy requirements for states contemplating parens patriae suits. 
One court has held that section 4F(b) abrogates rule 6(e) in this spe-
cific context, and requires that the Attorney General disclose grand 
jury materials to state attorneys general upon request. 16 Other courts 
have found that although section 4F(b) does not authorize the Attor-
ney General to release grand jury materials on his own authority, it 
nevertheless manifests congressional intent to modify rule 6(e)'s 
traditional secrecy requirements, permitting the court to disclose 
grand jury materials without a :finding of "particularized need."17 
And, :finally, still other courts have held that section 4F(b) did not 
change the disclosure standards for grand jury materials. 18 
This Note analyzes the controversy and concludes that the latter 
courts are correct: Congress never intended to abrogate or modify 
rule 6(e)'s "particularized need" standard when it enacted section 
Wis. 1965); Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Pa. 1962); In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 29 F.R.D. 151 (E.D. Pa 1961), '!lfd., 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962). 
16. The argument that§ 4F(b) abrogated the rule 6(e) disclosure standard assumes that 
Congress intended to place state attorneys general on an equal footing with the Justice Depart-
ment, so that both could use grand jury materials to support civil enforcement. See Brief for 
Appellees at 5, United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 619 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter 
cited as Goodrich Appellee's Brief]. The argument further assumes that rule 6(e) does not 
prohibit disclosure of grand jury materials requested merely to expedite civil discovery. See 
id. at 12-13. Although its opinion lacks clarity, the Ninth Circuit apparently adopted this 
approach, at least in part, in United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 619 F.2d 798 (1980). See text 
at note 23 infra. 
17. United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
IOI S. Ct. 1352 (1981); United States v. Cargo Gasoline Co., [1980-81) Trade Cas. 78,601 
(M.D. Fla. 1980); United States v. Campbell Hardware, Inc., (1979-2) Trade Cas. 78,615 (D. 
Mass. 1979) (basis of state attorney general's request not specified); In re Montgomery County 
Real Estate Antitrust Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 54, 62 (D. Md. 1978). 
18. Under this approach, a traditional showing of "particularized need" would continue to 
be a prerequisite to disclosure. Courts have grounded the conclusion that Congress did not 
intend to alter rule 6(e)'s disclosure standards on two different findings. First, some courts 
have held that grand jury materials are not within the scope of§ 4F(b). See Illinois Petition v. 
Widmar, [1980-81) Trade Cas. 78,103, 78,104-07 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Little Rock School Dist. v. 
Borden, Inc., (1979-2) Trade Cas. 78,715, 78,720-21 (E.D. Ark. 1979); In re Grand Jury which 
presented Criminal Indictments 76-149 and 77-72 in the Middle Dist. of Pa., 469 F. Supp. 666, 
671 (M.D. Pa 1978). Second, courts have held that§ 4F(b)'s ''to the extent permitted by law" 
clause incorporates rule 6(e) and the decisions interpreting that rule. In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation of Cuisinarts, Inc., [1981-1) Trade Cas. 76,531 (D. Conn. 1981); Illinois Petition v. 
Widmar, (1980-81) Trade Cas. 78,103, 78,104-07 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
In Illinois Petition, the petitioners argued that the juxtaposition of§ 4F(b) and rule 6(e) 
required disclosure of all the grand jury's materials to the Illinois Attorney General upon a 
showing of relevance. The court held that§ 4F(b) did not apply to materials acquired by and 
belonging to the grand jury itself: "[T)his section cannot be construed . . . to apply to grand 
jury materials acquired by the grand jury other than by virtue of the investigative work of the 
attorney and made available to the grand jury as a result of his own voluntary action." [ 1980-
81) Trade Cas. at 78,105. The court further observed that rule 6(e) determines, with the force 
and effect of law, when there may be disclosure of grand jury materials, (1980-81) Trade Cas, 
at 78,106, and rejected petitioners' claim that§ 4F(b) dispenses with the "particularized need" 
requirement. [1980-81) Trade Cas. at 78,107-08. Because petitioners failed to demonstrate 
"particularized need," the court rejected their disclosure request. 
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4F(b).19 Part I discusses whether Congress intended section 4F(b) to 
require the Attorney General to disclose grand jury materials to state 
attorneys general upon request, thereby abrogating rule 6(e)'s ex-
plicit prohibition against such disclosure. Part II examines the statu-
tory language and legislative history of sectiol). 4F(b) to determine 
whether Congress intended section 4F(b) to modify rule 6(e)'s "par-
ticularized need" standard. Finally, Part III evaluates the policies 
affected by liberalized disclosure of grand jury materials to state at-
torneys general. It concludes that liberalized disclosure will not sub-
stantially further the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act's purposes, but will 
undermine the grand jury's effectiveness as an aid to antitrust en-
forcement and impair the interests of both grand jury witnesses and 
targets. 
I. SECTION 4F(b) AS ABROGATING RULE 6(e) 
Section 4F(b) states: 
(b) To assist a State attorney general ... in bringing an action under 
this Act, the Attorney General of the United States shall, upon request 
by such State attorney general, make available to him, to the extent 
permitted by law, any investigative files or other materials which are or 
may be relevant or material to the actual or potential cause of action 
under this Act.20 
The language of section 4F(b) does not explicitly direct the Attorney 
General to disclose grand jury materials to state attorneys general; 
indeed, it does not even mention grand jury materials. 21 Instead, 
section 4F(b) merely directs the Attorney General to cooperate with 
state attorneys general by releasing relevant investigative materials 
"to the extent permitted by law." Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals concluded in United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co.22 
19. This Note considers only whether grand jury materials are "investigative files or other 
materials" within the meaning of the section and the impact of§ 4F(b )'s ''to the extent permit-
ted by law'' clause. A further limitation should be noted. Section 4F(b) requires only disclo-
sure of investigative materials that "are or may be relevant or material to the actual or 
potential cause of action under this Act." 15 U.S.C. § 15f(b) (1976). Although this limitation 
may determine whether materials will be released, see, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 13-16, 
United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 619 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Goodrich 
Appellant's Brief]; Goodrich Appellee's Brief, supra note 16, at 23-28, discussion of relevance 
or materiality is beyond the scope of the Note. 
20. 15 u.s.c. § 15f(b) (1976). 
21. This omission alone is significant. One court has observed: 
When "in other matters" Congress has intended to include transcripts of grand jury testi-
mony and matters acquired by grand jury process among materials that are to be pro-
duced by the prosecutor under specific circumstances, it has stated so expressly. There is 
no literal reading of 4F(b) nor traditional concept of statutory construction which sup-
parts the petitioner's contention on this point. 
Illinois Petition v. Widmar, (1980-81) Trade Cas. 78,103, 78,105 (N.D. ill. 1981) (footnote 
omitted). 
22. 619 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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that section 4F(b) abrogated rule 6(e)'s restrictions when state attor-
neys general seek disclosure of grand jury materials. 
B.F. Goodrich was an appeal from an order, pursuant to section 
4F(b ), permitting California and fifteen other states to inspect and 
copy federal grand jury materials. A grand jury investigating the 
B.F. Goodrich Company had completed its term in February 1978 
without returning any indictments. The United States filed a civil 
action against the company in August 1978. California filed against 
Goodrich in September 1978, and moved to inspect and copy all of 
the grand jury materials gathered during the federal investigation. 
Fifteen other states that had not filed actions against Goodrich 
joined in California's motion. The district court order permitted 
each state to inspect and copy the materials. The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, holding that (I) grand jury materials are "investigative files 
or other materials" within the meaning of § 4F(b ), and (2) grand 
jury materials are available to state attorneys general without any 
showing of "particularized need," "except where specifically prohib-
ited."23 
The accuracy of the B.F. Goodrich holding can be tested by a 
two-part inquiry into the language and legislative history of section 
4F(b). To fall within the scope of the section, federal grand jury 
materials must meet two criteria: first, they must be "investigative 
files or other materials" within the meaning of the statute; and, sec-
ond, they must be the kind of investigative materials that the Attor-
ney General is permitted by law to disclose. The analysis below 
concludes that grand jury materials meet neither of these criteria, 
and that Congress did not intend section 4F(b) to abrogate rule 6(e). 
A. The Meaning of "Investigative Files or Other Materials" 
States that seek grand jury materials under section 4F(b) typi-
23. 619 F.2d at 800. The Ninth Circuit must have decided that rule 6(e) did not "specifi-
cally prohibit" disclosure of grand jury materials to aid a state attorney general's civil discov-
ery effort. If this is true, judicial adjudication of a state attorney general's disclosure request 
would be unnecessary and improper because§ 4F(b) mandated disclosure by the government's 
attorneys. See 619 F.2d at 801; Illinois Petition v. Widmar [1980-81) Trade Cas. 78,103, 78,106 
(N.D. Ill. 1981). A court order would be necessary only if the Attorney General was unwilling 
to make delivery. [1980-81) Trade Cas. at 78,107. 
The B.F. Goodrich court failed to define adequately the scope of permissible disclosure. It 
follows logically from its opinion that disclosure may always be proper. Either rule 6(e) specif-
ically prohibits disclosure of grand jury materials to state attorneys general merely to expedite 
civil discovery, or it does not. To avoid this result, the court took two steps. First, it concluded 
that disclosure was specifically prohibited unless the grand jury returned no indictment or no 
criminal charges were pending against the defendant. 619 F.2d at 801. Second, the court 
twisted the meaning of§ 4F(b), holding that the Attorney General need not disclose grand 
jury materials if he objects to their disclosure. 619 F.2d at 801. Essentially, the court abdi-
cated judicial responsibility to the Justice Department. This position seems irreconcilable with 
§ 4F(b)'s provision that the Attorney General "shall" disclose his investigative materials "to 
the extent permitted by law." 
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cally argue that evidence presented to a grand jury prima facie falls 
within the category of "investigative files or other materials" that the 
Attorney General is directed to disclose. 24 The argument is plausible 
because a wealth of case law and scholarly commentary recognizes 
the value of the grand jury as an investigative body.25 Nevertheless, 
careful attention to the language of section 4F(b) reveals that grand 
jury records were not the type of "investigative files or other materi-
als" that Congress intended the Attorney General to disclose. 
In providing that ''the Attorney General . . . shall . . . make 
available, to the extent permitted by law, any investigative files or 
other materials,"26 section 4F(b) does not purport to give the Attor-
ney General new disclosure powers; rather, it limits his discretion to 
refuse requests for materials that he is empowered to disclose. Be-
cause section 4F(b) requires the Attorney General to disclose rele-
vant materials to the the extent permitted by law and not to seek 
disclosure from other agencies or branches of government, "investi-
gative files or other materials" must refer only to materials of the 
Justice .Department. Otherwise, the Attorney General would violate 
section 4F(b) by failing to disclose materials over which he has no 
control. 
Although this interpretation of "investigative files and other 
materials" is facially more restrictive than the language of the stat-
ute, the legislative history directly supports it. The only discussion of 
the meaning of this clause is found in the House Report on the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act. The report states that section 4F_(b) requires the 
Attorney General to make available only "the Justice Department's 
investigative files."27 At least one court has endorsed this more re-
strictive reading of the statute.28 
24. See, e.g. , Brief of the State of Maryland as Amicus Curiae at 20, United States v. 
Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1352 (1981) 
(hereinafter cited as Maryland Brief]. 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974); United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13, 15 (1973); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 525 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 
1975); HANDBOOK, supra note 18; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND EN-
FORCEMENT, REP. No. 4, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 37 (1931). 
The grand jury was originally considered to be an accusatory body. Hefferman, The Inves-
tigative Role of the Prosecutor, in PRETRIAL PROBLEMS OF THE PROSECUTOR 5 (Supp.: Use of 
the Investigative Grand Jury, J. Douglass ed. 1978). 
26. 15 U.S.C. § 15f(b) (1976) (emphasis added). 
27. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 17, [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2586. 
See Illinois Petition v. Widmar, [1980-81) Trade Cas. 78,103, 78,105 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
28. See Illinois Petition v. Widmar, [1980-81) Trade Cas. 78,103 (N.D. Ill. 1981): 
While grand jury materials are traditionally property of the Judicial Branch of govern-
ment, I conclude that Section 4F(b) applies only and exlusively to the investigative Jiles and 
other materials acquired by and belonging lo the Executive Branch, of which the Justice 
.Department is a member. Congress has been careful not to offend the fundamental con-
cept of separation of powers. Courts should be exceptionally careful not to offend that 
concept in a zealous effort to assist the Executive Branch in the performance of its charac-
teristically executive responsibilities. 
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The question, then, is whether grand jury proceedings are "inves-
tigative :files or other materials" of the Justice Department. Al-
though states seeking disclosure debate the point,29 both the courts 
and the Congress view grand jury proceedings as records of the judi-
ciary. The courts have traditionally held that the grand jury is an 
arm of the judiciary, and that grand jurors are officers of the court 
rather than of the executive or legislative branches of government.30 
They view grand jury proceedings as the court's records, and the de-
cision whether to make them public as the court's responsibility.31 
Mr. Justice Whittaker clearly stated this view in his concurring opin-
ion in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co. : "Grand jury minutes 
[1980-81) Trade Cas. at 78,105-06 (emphasis original). 
29. Parties opposing disclosure of grand jury materials pursuant to § 4F(b) argue that the 
grand jury is an arm of the court and its proceedings constitute a judicial inquiry. They con-
clude that grand jury materials are investigative files of the court that convened the grand jury 
rather than of the Justice Department. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 10-11, United States v. 
Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1352 (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as Colonial Appellee's Brief]; Goodrich Appellant's Brief, supra note 19, at 9. 
In response, state attorneys general advance two arguments. First, they claim that this position 
is specious because the court cannot act as investigator, prosecutor, and judge in the same 
litigation. See, e.g., Virginia Reply Brief at 11-12, United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 
629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1352 (1981). Second, they argue that once 
the grand jury proceedings have concluded, its documents are held by the Justice Department 
for use in enforcement actions. As such, these materials become the Department's investiga-
tive files. See, e.g., id. at 12. 
30. E.g., J.R. Simplot Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., (1977-1) U.S. Tax Cas. 86,195, 86,197 
(9th Cir. 1976) ("In addition, the grand jury is a constitutional entity under court supervision, 
not a tool available for Executive branch purposes."); United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, 
I 106 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Fisher, 455 F.2d 1101, 1105 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Swear-
ingen Aviation Corp., 486 F. Supp. 9, 11 (D. Md. 1979). The Supreme Court has accepted the 
"arm of the judiciary'' characterization on a number of occasions. E.g., Levine v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 610, 617 (1960); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940); Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66 (1906). 
31. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1958) (Whittaker, J. 
concurring); United States v. Penrod, 609 F.2d 1092, 1097 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 
917 (1980); Calkins, supra note 11, at 488 n.131; Recent .Developments in the Law of the Federal 
Grand Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 170, 232 n.378. 
Other courts and commentators conclude that the grand jury is a law enforcement agency, 
and an investigative and prosecutorial arm of the executive branch. E.g., In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459, 461 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959); Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Reve-
nue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("However, in broad general terms our findings 
of fact fairly and substantially support the claim that the grand jury is essentially controlled by 
the United States attorney and is his prosecutorial tool"); Wilson & Metz, Obtaining Evidence 
far Federal Economic Crime Prosecutions: An Overview and Analysis of Investigative Methods, 
14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 651,683 (1977); Recent .Developments in the Law of the Federal Grand 
Jury, supra, at 212. The context in which courts use this description is, however, important • 
. Courts have not characterized the grand jury as an arm of the executive branch in cases involv-
ing access to or control of grand jury documents or transcripts. Rather, these cases deal prima-
rily with the scope of the grand jury inquiry, and the court's authority to circumscribe that 
inquiry. 
A third group of courts characterize the grand jury as a preconstitutional institution, not 
relegated to a position within any of the three branches of government - an independent 
body. See, e.g., United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
825 (1977). 
May 1981] Note - Grand Jury Materials 1243 
and transcripts are not the property of the government's attorneys, 
agents or investigators. . . . Instead, those documents are the 
records of the court."32 Similarly, Congress recognized that grand 
jury materials are records of the court when it enacted rule 6( e ). Al-
though the Justice Department actively participates in grand jury in-
vestigations,33 and serves as the custodian for certain grand jury 
materials, 34 rule 6( e) vests control over the disclosure of these mate-
rials solely in the courts. 35 This disclosure scheme indicates that 
Congress, like the courts, considers grand jury materials to fall 
within the province of the judiciary, rather than the Justice Depart-
ment.36 
32. 356 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1958). 
33. The Antitrust Division has legal responsibility for the conduct of grand jury proceed-
ings. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.40(a) (1980). 
34. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(l). 
35. See Little Rock School Dist v. Borden, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. 78,715, 78,720 (E.D. 
Ark. 1979). Contra United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943, 946-47 (4th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1352 (1981); United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 619 F.2d 798, 
800 (9th Cir. 1980). 
Rule 6(e)(2) codifies the rule of grand jury secrecy, and rule 6(e)(3) provides two excep-
tions, each of which is subject to close supervision. 
First, rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i) allows disclosure to "attorneys for the government" for use in the 
performance of their duties. Attorneys for the government do not include state attorneys gen-
eral See note 13 supra. Similarly, rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) permits a government attorney to dis-
close grand jury materials to government personnel deemed necessary to assist in the 
enforcement of federal criminal laws. Congress added this exception in 1977 to accommodate 
government attorneys' needs to make use of nonattorney expertise in complex criminal litiga-
tion. S. REP. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS at 530. State attorneys general contemplating civil antitrust actions are not within this 
exception to the general rule of nondisclosure. If the government attorney makes a disclosure 
under rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii), he must immediately report it to the district court FED. R. CRIM. P. 
6(e)(3)(B); United States v. Hogan, 489 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (W.D. Wash. 1980). 
In United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 
S. Ct 1352 (1981), the Fourth Circuit analogized disclosure to state attorneys general to the 
power given by rule 6(e) to disclose grand jury materials to attorneys for the government for. 
use in the performance of their official duties. 629 F.2d at 950 n.21. If the court meant that it 
could treat a state attorney general as aµ "attorney for the government," reliance on this anal-
ogy is misplaced. If it meant that state attorneys general are governmental personnel deemed 
necessary by an attorney for the government to assist in the enforcement of federal criminal 
law, the court was similarly misguided. The state attorney general was suing under federal, 
civil law, not enforcing federal criminal law. Almost every civil action may add to the deter-
rent effect of criminal-law enforcement to some degree. If courts permit disclosure for civil use 
in order to aid federal criminal-law enforcement, the congressionally imposed limitation on 
disclosure would become meaningless. But see Betts v. Coltes, 449 F. Supp. 751 (D. Hawaii 
1978). 
The second category of exception falls under rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i), which authorizes court-
ordered disclosure of grand jury materials "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial 
proceeding." Such disclosure is to be made "in a manner, at such time, and under such condi-
tions as the court may direct" Absent an exception, disclosure of grand jury materials violates 
rule 6(e)(2) and is punishable as a contempt of court. Although rule 6(e) permits "attorneys 
for the government" to use grand jury materials in performance of their duty, it vests control 
over the disclosure of these materials solely with the courts. 
36. In an analogous context, the Justice Department and the courts have not considered 
grand jury materials records of the Justice Department, despite the Justice Department's use 
and possession of such materials. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 
1244 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 79:1234 
If grand jury materials belong to the courts rather than to the 
Justice Department, they are not among the "investigative files or 
materials" that the Attorney General can disclose pursuant to section 
4F(b).37 State attorneys general have bridled at this conclusion.38 
They complain that exempting grand jury materials would com-
(1976), makes available certain "agency records" to any person upon request. Although in 
some cases mere agency possession has sufficed to make materials "agency records," this is not 
always true. Note, The .Definition of ":Agency Records" Under the Freedom of Information Act, 
31 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1106-09 (1979). In Walter, Conston, Schurtman & Gumpel v. Depart-
ment of Justice, 79 Civ. 2918 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1979) (slip opinion), the plaintiff served a FOIA 
request on the Justice Department seeking materials that the government admittedly pos-
sessed. The government noted that many of the requested documents had been presented to a 
grand jury and were grand jury exhibits, and argued that since the grand jury is a branch of 
the judiciary and not a part of the Justice Department, its exhibits did not constitute "agency 
records" and could not be disclosed. The court agreed, holding that agency possession of 
grand jury documents did not convert them into agency records. 
Valenti v. Department of Justice, 503 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. La. 1980), presented the same 
issue. Plaintiff, a former grand jury witness, sought a transcript of his testimony under the 
FOIA and rule 6( e ). The court held that the grand jury was an appendage of the court; there-
fore, its records were court records. The plaintiff argued that because the Justice Department 
exercised substantial control over the transcript, it should be considered an agency record sub-
ject to disclosure under the FOIA. In response, the court noted: 
It is true that Rule 6(e)(l) places any notes, recording, or transcript prepared from the 
grand jury proceedings "in the custody or control of the attorney for the government." 
The provision does not, however, change the essential nature of the transcript from a 
court record to an agency record, and the mere physical location of the transcript in the 
office of the local United States Attorney does not render it an agency record for FOIA 
purposes. See Kissinger v. Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 
100 S.Ct. 960, 972, 63 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980). . . . [T)he local United States Attorney is the 
physical custodian of grand jury transcripts; his use of those records is limited by Rule 
i5(e), and the court retains ultimate control over the documents. Plaintiff's grand jury 
transcript is a court record generated by an arm of the court, and it remains a court record 
despite the fact that the local United States Attorney is its physical custodian. 
503 F. Supp. at 233. 
Although agency records for FOIA purposes may differ from "investigative files or other 
materials" for§ 4F(b) purposes, the court's analysis supports this Note's argument that mere 
use and possession of grand jury materials do not transform them from court records into 
materials of the Justice Department. The rationale for such a conclusion is the same in both 
contexts: although the Attorney General has possession of grand jury materials, the grand jury 
is an arm of the judiciary, and the court retains ultimate control over such documents. A 
number of courts in other contexts have also held that agency possession and use do not trans-
form court documents into "agency records." See Warth v. Department of Justice, 595 F.2d 
521 (9th Cir. 1979) (trial manuscript); Cook v. Willingham, 400 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1968) 
(presentence investigation report); Smith v. Flaherty, 465 F. Supp. 815 (M.D. Pa. 1978) 
(presentence reports and probation officer's memorandum). 
31. See Illinois Petition v. Widmar, (1980-81] Trade Cas. 78,103, 78,105-06 (N.D. Ill. 
1981). But see United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943, 947 (4th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1352 (1981) (holding that grand jury materials are investigative materi-
als). 
38. States argue that if grand jury materials are not investigative files, they are certainly 
"other materials." See, e.g., Maryland Brief, supra note 24, at 21. They claim that Congress 
added this phrase to insure disclosure of all relevant information. See Brief for Appellant at 
16, United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. 
Ct. 1352 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Colonial Appellant's Brief]. But see Illinois Petition v. 
Widmar, (1980-81] Trade Cas. 78,103, 78,105 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (phrase "other materials" does 
not relate to "materials presented to the grand jury and in particular does not relate to matters 
acquired by grand jury process only"). 
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pletely frustrate Congress's intent to encourage antitrust enforcement 
and would nullify the effect of section 4F(b).39 In truth, however, a 
wide range of useful materials would remain available under section 
4F(b) even if grand jury materials were excluded. State attorneys 
general could obtain information from complaints to the government 
by businessmen and other private parties,40 government economic 
data and analysis,41 information obtained through investigations by 
the Justice Department staff and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion,42 staff memoranda on points of law, and information that the 
Justice Department obtained through civil discovery.43 The phrase 
"investigative files and other materials" is, therefore, far from gutted 
by a reading that excludes grand jury materials. Such a reading, 
supported by the language of section 4F(b) as well as its legislative 
history, promotes state parens patriae suits without invading the 
traditional province of the judiciary. 
39. See, e.g., Colonial Appellant's Brief, supra note 38, at 14-15. 
40. This often quite detailed information could be disclosed unless the Justice Department 
has promised confidentiality to the source. See J. VON KALINOWSKI, 16L BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 91.02 (1980). 
41. See Antitrust Parens Patriae Amendments: Hearings on H.R 12528 and H.R 12921 
Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Comm., 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1974) (statement of Thomas Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust 
Division); Comegys, Quo Vadis: Case Selection by the Antitrust .Division of the .Department of 
Justice, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 563, 564-65 (1977). 
42. The Justice Department uses the Federal Bureau of Investigation and its own staff 
extensively in the investigation of antitrust violations. See J. VON KALINOWKSI, supra note 40, 
at§§ 9l.03-9l.04;Antitrust Improvements Act Hearings, supra note 9, at 175 (statement of J.W. 
Riehm & J.R. Wilson); Mahaffie, Criminal Antitrust Investigations, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 521 
(1972); Reycraft, Criminal Antitrust Proceedings, 1963 ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 64, 66; Steinhouse, 
The Effect of Justice .Department and FTC Cases on Private Antitrust Litigation, 34 OHIO ST. 
LJ. 490,492 (1973). These investigations frequently include extensive interviews with indus-
try members and others with relevant information, see J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 40, at 
§ 91.04, and this information would be available for disclosure under § 4F(b). See Illinois 
Petition v. Widmar, [1980-81) Trade Cas. 78,103, 78,105 (N.D. Ill. 1981). A substantial 
amount of FBI materials was apparently available for disclosure in Colonial Chevrolet. With 
reference to that case, Attorney General Griffin Bell advised Congress of the importance of 
such interviews to investigations of the Antitrust Division: 
[I]n a recent investigation in the Norfolk, Virginia area, the FBI conducted simultaneous 
interviews with a large number of persons involved in a particular industry, and at the 
same time executed a search warrant on a trade association headquarters. This joint effort 
by the Division and the FBI, it seems to me, is something we shall look for more of in the 
future. 
Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopolies 
of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 492 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Oversight 
Hearings]. 
43. The Justice Department's investigative files also may include substantial amounts of 
information obtained through civil discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 
Sloan, Antitrust: Shared Information between the FTC and the .Department of Justice, 1979 B. 
Y.U. L. REV. 883, 886-87. Staff memoranda developing legal theories would also be available 
under § 4F(b) (to the extent that they do not incorporate information obtained through a 
grand jury). 
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B. The Meaning of "to the Extent Permitted by Law" 
Even if mere possession and use of grand jury materials trans-
formed them into "investigative files or other materials" of the Jus-
tice Department,44 states would still have to show that disclosure of 
grand jury materials is "permitted by law." Section 4F(b) states that 
upon request by a state attorney general, the Attorney General shall 
make available, "to the extent permitted by law," any relevant inves-
tigative materials. The "to the extent permitted by law" proviso can 
pose a considerable obstacle to state discovery efforts. Indeed, the 
Justice Department's Antitrust Division takes the position that this 
restriction incorporates by reference rule 6( e )(2), and, therefore, pro-
hibits the Attorney General from disclosing grand jury materials.45 
On its face, the language of section 4F(b) suggests that Congress 
intended to require the Attorney General to disclose relevant materi-
als except where prohibited by other laws. The legislative history 
supports this reading of the statute. The House Report interpreted 
section 4F(b)'s "to the extent permitted by law" restriction to mean 
"that the files are to be made available except where spec!ftcally pro-
hibited."46 
44. See United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943, 946-47 (4th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1352 (1981); United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 619 F.2d 798, 800 (9th 
Cir. 1980). 
45. When the Division's investigative files requested by a state attorney general contain 
grand jury materials . . . , it is the Division's position that such disclosure is prohibited 
without a court order pursuant to Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
While there may be some dispute whether Section 4F(b) creates an exception to the appli-
cation of Rule 6(e), the Division interprets Rule 6(e) as covering grand jury matenals 
sought by state attorneys general under Section 4F. This interpretation is justified and 
warranted by the objectives embodied in the grand jury secrecy rule and such an interpre-
tation is in the best mterests of protecting the efficiency and integrity of grand jury investi-
gations as a law enforcement tool. 
Antitrust .Division Manual, at Vll-13 (Aug. 27, 1979), quoted in NATL. A. ATTORNEYS GEN· 
E.RAL ANTITRUST REP., Dec. 1980, at 4. But see Brief for the United States, United States v •. 
B.F. Goodrich Co., 619 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1980). 
46. HOUSE RE.PORT, supra note 2, at 17, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2586 
(emphasis added). The House Report on§ 4F states: 
Section 4F promotes parens patriae actions as a major aspect of antitrust enforcement 
by encouraging Federal-State cooperation. The section provides that whenever the 
United States has brought suit in its proprietary capacity under § 4A of the Clayton Act, 
and the U.S. Attorney General believes that the same antitrust violation may have given 
rise to potential parens patriae claims, he shall notify the appropriate State attorneys gen-
eral. Whenever a State attorney general so requests, in order to evaluate the notice from 
the U.S. Attorney General or in order to bring a parens patriae action, section 4F(b) 
requires the U.S. Attorney General to make the Justice Department's investigative files 
available to the State attorneys general "to the extent pennitted by law." This means that 
the files are to be made available except where specifically prohibited. 
Section 4F(b) reflects the committee's desire that the Federal Government cooperate 
fully with State antitrust enforcers. 
The benefits of increases in Federal-State cooperation and coordination of antitrust 
enforcement are obvious, and are achieved in H.R. 8532 without the expenditure of addi-
tional Federal funds. 
Id. at 17, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2586-87. 
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If grand jury materials are within its scope, section 4F(b) incor-
porates by reference rule 6(e)(2), which specifically prohibits the At-
torney General from disclosing grand jury materials to state 
attorneys general for use in civil suits. Rule 6( e )(2) states the general 
rule of secrecy: "[a]n attorney for the govemment47 ••• shall not 
disclose matters occurring before the grand jury except as otherwise 
provided for in these rules. A knowing violation . . . may be pun-
ished as a contempt of court."48 Unless one of the rule 6(e)(3) excep-
tions applies, rule 6(e)(2) spec!fica/ly prohibits the Attorney General 
from disclosing grand jury materials to state attorneys general to 
promote civil actions. Rule 6(e)(3) contains no such exception.49 
Thus, the Attorney General is specifically prohibited from disclosing 
grand jury materials to state attorneys general under rule 6(e)(2), 
and, therefore, is not "permitted by law'' to make available such 
materials under section 4F(b).50 
This conclusion is supported by the only specific reference to 
grand jury materials in section 4F(b)'s legislative history. Senator 
Abourezk, the Senate floor manager for the conference committee 
bill, stated: 
47. Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure defines "attorney for the gov-
ernment" as "the Attorney General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General .... " 
See note 13 supra. 
48. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). 
49. Rule 6(e)(3)'s exceptions permit the Attorney General to disclose grand jury materials 
only to government personnel deemed necessary to assist in the enforcement of the federal 
criminal law. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii). Pursuant to this exception, the Attorney Gen-
eral could disclose grand jury materials to state attorneys general to aid the enforcement of 
federal criminal law. But, the Attorney General may not discJose grand jury materials to state 
attorneys general to expedite discovery in civil antitrust suits. 
50. Decisions on the effect of rule 6(e) on the FOIA's disclosure requirement, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552 (1976), support the finding that rule 6(e) specifically prohibits disclosure of grand jury 
materials. The FOIA's disclosure mandate does not apply to matters that are 
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552(b) of this title), 
provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in 
such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria 
for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld. 
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). The FOIA's "specifically exempted" restriction is similar in lan-
guage and purpose to § 4F(b)'s restriction. Congress limited the scope of both statutes by 
reference to external statutory prohibitions. As applied to grand jury materials, both statutes 
are limited by rule 6(e). The government has opposed FOIA requests for grand jury materials 
on the ground that rule 6(e) "specifically exempts" grand jury materials from disclosure, and 
the courts have uniformly agreed. See Thomas v. United States, 597 F.2d 656, 657 (8th Cir. 
1979); Librach v. FBI, 587 F.2d 372, 373 (8th Cir. 1978); Piccolo v. Department of Justice, 49 
U.S.L.W. 2722 (D.D.C. May 13, 1981); Murphy v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 1138, 1140-41 (D.D.C. 
1980); Walter, Conston, Schurtman & Gumpel v. Department of Justice, 79 Civ. 2918 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1979) (slip opinion); Fund for Constitutional Govt. v. National Archives & 
Records Serv., 485 F. Supp. 1, 10.12 (D.D.C. 1979); Hiss v. Department of Justice, 441 F. 
Supp. 69, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But cf. Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945, 
951-52 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not constitute a statute for pur-
poses of FOIA exemption). If rule 6(e) "specifically exempts" grand jury materials from dis-
closure under the FOIA, it follows that rule 6(e) "specifically prohibits" disclosure under 
§4F(b). 
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The section specifically limits the Attorney General's power to release 
documents to whatever his powers are under existing law. Under ex-
isting law he cannot tum over materials given in response to a grand 
jury demand or a civil investigative demand. Therefore, the section is 
limited by law to cases where materials were turned over voluntarily.51 
These remarks indicate that Congress was well aware that the "to the 
extent permitted by law" provision would prohibit the disclosure of 
grand jury materials under section 4F(b).52 
Recognizing that rule 6( e) prohibits the Attorney General from 
disclosing grand jury materials to state attorneys general for use in a 
civil suit, states have argued that because a court could disclose 
grand jury materials under rule 6(e)'(3)(C)(i), disclosure is not specif-
ically prohibited for the purposes of section 4F(b). In other words, 
since a court can disclose grand jury materials upon a finding of 
51. 122 CONG. REC. 29,160 (1976). 
A few courts have erroneously concluded lhat Senator Abourezk's statement does not indi-
cate that Congress intended to bar disclosure of grand jury materials. Because the remarks 
were made in lhe course of a floor debate, one court felt lhat Ibey were less reliable indicators 
of congressional intent lhan lhe House Report, and lhat Ibey could not alter the "plain lan-
guage" of lhe statute. In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litigation, 452 F. 
Supp. 54, 62 n.5 (D. Md. 1978). This decision is incorrect for several reasons. First, as the 
Note indicates,§ 4F(b) is subject to more lhan one interpretation; its "plain language" con-
tains no reference to grand jury materials. Second, lhe House Report does not indicate that 
Congress intended lhe Attorney General to release grand jury proceedings pursuant to 
§ 4F(b). See text at notes 27-28 supra. Third, courts generally regard the floor manager's 
interpretation of a bill as aulhoritative and give weight to statements made during floor de-
bates when construing statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 70 n.26 (2d Cir. 
1977); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 380 F.2d 770, 782 (2d Cir. 1967). 
Anolher court concluded lhat Senator Abourezk meant only that lhe Attorney General 
could not voluntarily turn over grand jury materials; since a court could order disclosure under 
rule 6(e), § 4F(b) aulhorized disclosure in proper cases. United States v. Colonial Chevrolet 
Corp., 629 F.2d 943, 947-48 (41h Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1352 (1981). The court 
appears to have twisted lhe Senator's language to obtain lhe conclusion that it desired. Sena-
tor Abourezk's remarks indicate lhat only materials lhat lhe Attorney General may disclose 
wilhout a court order are wilhin lhe scope of§ 4F(b). He did not say lhe Attorney General 
could not voluntarily tum over grand jury materials; ralher, he indicated lhat lhe Attorney 
General could only disclose materials turned over voluntarily. (Presumably the Justice De-
partment could also disclose any product of its investigations lhat was not obtained by a grand 
jury subpoena or a civil investigative demand.) 
52. The Antitrust .Division Manual also recognizes lhat rule 6(e) prohibits the disclosure of 
grand jury materials by lhe Attorney General under§ 4F(b). See note 45 supra. Olhers famil-
iar wilh lhe legislation have reached similar conclusions. John Shenefield of the Antitrust 
Division observed lhat lhe ''to lhe extent permitted by law" clause of§ 4F(b) indicated con-
gressional intent lhat lhe rule 6(e) grand jury secrecy requirements "remain in full force and 
effect." [1977) ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 822, July 14, 1977, at D-1. 
Shenefield later observed: 
We interpret Rule 6(e) oflhe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to prohibit the disclo-
sure of grand jury materials wilhout a court order. However, if our investigation or any 
resulting prosecution has terminated, we will usually join in an application by lhe state 
attorney general to lhe court for lheir disclosure under 4F(b). 
[1978) ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 892, Dec. 7, 1978, at D-7. Asked about the 
congressional intent wilh respect to § 4F(b), Bernard Nash, assistant counsel to the Senate 
Antitrust Subcommittee, indicated lhat grand jury materials would not be subject to disclo-
sure. [1977) ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 795, Jan. 4, 1977, at D-6. 
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"particularized need," the states assert that section 4F(b) requires the 
Attorney General to make such materials available to state attorneys 
general merely upon request.53 This argument fails for two reasons. 
First, the "to the extent permitted by law" clause specifically restricts 
disclosure by the Attorney General. Rule 6(e) may grant discretion 
to the courts to disclose grand jury materials, but it specifically pro-
hibits the Attorney General from making such disclosure. Logically, 
the extent to which a court or other governmental entity could order 
disclosure of grand jury materials has no bearing on the extent to 
which the law permits the Attorney General to make such disclosure. 
To interpret section 4F(b) to require the Attorney General to make 
available materials whenever another entity can legally disclose 
them, even though the Attorney General is specifically prohibited 
from doing so, does not comport with a rational reading of the stat-
ute or its legislative history.54 
Second, the state's argument fails because rule 6(e) prohibits even 
court-ordered disclosure of grand jury materials to state attorneys 
general to expedite civil discovery. 55 The need to expedite civil dis-
covery does not satisfy the "particularized need" requirement.56 Al-
though a court may release grand jury materials on an appropriate 
53. See, e.g., Colonial Appellant's Brief, supra note 38, at 13-14; Goodrich Appellee's Brief, 
supra note 16, at 12-13. 
54. See notes 46-52 supra and accompanying text. 
55. States seeking grand jury materials argue that governmental bodies are entitled to spe-
cial status when seeking access to such materials. They claim that expedition of discovery may 
justify disclosure to a governmental plaintiff although not to a private plaintiff. See, e.g., Colo-
nial Appellant's Brief, supra note 38, at 23; Goodrich Appellee's Brief, supra note 16, at 34-36. 
Although the states cite a number of cases for this proposition, see, e.g., United States v. Saks 
& Co., 426 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); In re Cement-Concrete Block Chicago Area Grand 
Jury Proceedings, [1974-1] Trade Cas. 97,052 (N.D. Ill. 1974); United States v. Darling-Dela-
ware, Inc., [1972] Trade Cas. 91,458 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc., [1969] Trade Cas. 86,826 (N.D. Ill. 1968), the reasoning is unpersuasive in this context. 
Most of these cases involved access to grand jury documents and not transcripts. This is an 
important distinction. See, e.g., United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979); Golden Quality Ice Cream Co. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc., 
[1980-2] Trade Cas. 76,470 (E.D. Pa. 1980); United States v. Saks & Co., 426 F. Supp. 812 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). . 
Most courts have been equally unwilling to permit disclosure of grand jury materials to 
expedite civil discovery whether the party seeking access is a governmental body or a private 
party. See, e.g., Texas v. United States Steel Corp., 546 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 889 (1977); Illinois Petition v. Widmar, [1980-81] Trade Cas. 78,103 (N.D. Ill. 1981); 
Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968); Application of Cal. to 
Inspect Grand Jury Subpoenas, 195 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1961). And Congress clearly re-
jected the states' position with respect to federal agencies. See note 82 infra. Finally, disclo-
sure to state attorneys general may result in disclosure to other private parties; the need for 
secrecy is thus no less important in a state suit than in a private suit. See text at notes 116-24 
infra. 
56. In contrast to a desire to expedite civil discovery, a need to use the grand jury transcript 
to impeach a witness at trial, to refresh his memory, or to test his credibility may constitute 
"particularized need." See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958). 
Such uses of transcripts may be necessary to avoid misleading the trier of fact, and the court 
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showing of need, the states cannot show that need in these cases. 
Rule 6(e), therefore, specifically prohibits both the Attorney General 
and the courts from disclosing grand jury materials to state attorneys 
general to expedite discovery. Not even the state's creative interpre-
tation of the "to the extent permitted by law" restriction would per-
mit the Attorney General to disclose grand jury materials under 
section 4F(b).57 
In summary, the language and legislative history of section 4F(b) 
explain that the "to the extent permitted by law" restriction forbids 
any disclosure of "investigative files or other materials" that is spe-
cifically prohibited by law. Under rule 6(e)(2), the Attorney General 
is specifically prohibited from disclosing grand jury materials to state 
attorneys general for civil law enforcement purposes. States seeking 
disclosure of grand jury materials under section 4F(b) have argued 
that rule 6(e)(2) does not specifically prohibit disclosure because the 
courts can order disclosure under rule 6(e)(3). However, section 
4F(b) is addressed to the Attorney General, not the courts, and rule 
6(e)(3)'s "particularized need" standard specifically prohibits even 
court-ordered disclosure of grand jury materials to state attorneys 
general to expedite discovery. Even if grand jury materials are "in-
vestigative files or other materials," section 4F(b)'s "to the extent 
permitted by law" restriction prohibits the Attorney General from 
making grand jury materials in his possession available to state at-
torneys general. 
II. SECTION 4F(b) AS MODIFYING RULE 6(e)'s "PARTICULARIZED 
NEED" REQUIREMENT 
Although section 4F(b) does not authorize the Attorney General 
can limit disclosure to the portions of a witness's testimony that bear directly on his testimony 
at trial. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 221, 222 n.12 (1979). 
Some courts have recognized the unfairness of permitting one side "to have exclusive ac-
cess to a storehouse of relevant fact" as another factor bearing on the need for disclosure. 
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 873 (1966) (footnote omitted). If a defendant has ob-
tained access to grand jury testimony, these courts will permit civil plaintiffs to inspect the 
same materials. See, e.g., Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 777 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 889 (1977); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, (1980-1) Trade Cas. 77,920 
(S.D. Tex. 1980); Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., (1978-1) Trade Cas. 74,369 (E.D. 
Ark. 1978); In re Sugar Antitrust Litigation, (1977-2] Trade Cas. 73,344 (N.D. Cal. 1977); In re 
Toilet Seat Antitrust Litigation, (1975-2) Trade Cas. 67,444 (E.D. Mich. 1975). 
Other factors may constitute "particularized need" as well. The job of the courts is to 
''weigh carefully the competing interests in light of the relevant circumstances and the stan-
dards announced by [the Supreme Court]." Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 
U.S. at 223. 
57. In short, because the states cannot demonstrate "particularized need" in these cases, 
rule 6(e) prohibits disclosure. Release by a court absent "particularized need" would consti-
tute an abuse of discretion. See In re June 20, 1977 Concurrent Grand Jury Investigation, J. 
Ray McDermott & Co., 622 F.2d 166, 172 (5th Cir. 1980). To say that disclosure in these cases 
is not "specifically prohibited" because a court may authorize disclosure under a different set 
of facts is to blur the distinctions on which rule 6(e) cases tum. 
May 1981] Note - Grand Jury Materials 1251 
to release grand jury materials to state attorneys general without a 
court order, it may have altered the standards under which court 
orders are to be granted. Traditionally, courts have required that 
state attorneys general, as well as private parties, demonstrate "par-
ticularized need" before obtaining access to federal grand jury 
materials. 58 The central element of the "particularized need" test is 
a requirement that the need for disclosure outweigh the need for 
continued secrecy.59 The Fourth Circuit and several other courts 
have held that although section 4F(b) did not abrogate rule 6(e), it 
nevertheless represents a congressional judgment that state attorneys 
general should have access to federal grand jury materials under rule 
6(e)(3)(C) without a demonstration of "particularized need."60 
58. See, e.g., Texas v. United States Steel Corp., 546 F.2d 626 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 889 (1977); Illinois Petition v. Widmar, (1980-81] Trade Cas. 78,103 (N.D. Ill. 1981); In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 483 F. Supp. 422, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Little Rock School Dist. v. 
Borden, Inc., (1979-2] Trade Cas. 78,715 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd on other grounds, (1980-2] 
Trade Cas. 76,779 (8th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Criminal Indictments 76-149 and 77-72 in 
the Middle Dist. of Pa., 469 F. Supp. 666 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Minnesota v. United States Steel 
Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 579 (D. Minn. 1968); Petition of Brooke, 229 F. Supp. 377 (D. Mass. 
1964); Application of Cal. to Inspect Grand Jury Subpoenas, 195 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1961); 
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT 
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 50 (1979); Note, Disclosure of Federal 
Grand Jury Materials, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 399, 402 (1977). Contra, United States 
v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1352 (1981); 
United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 619 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Montgomery County 
Real Estate Antitrust Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 54 (D. Md. 1978). Most state attorneys general 
believe that relaxation of the "particularized need" requirement would significantly enhance 
state enforcement efforts. Reviving State E'!forcement, supra note 3, at 662. 
In Colonial Chevrolet, the Fourth Circuit asserted that the "particularized need" standard 
applied only when "disclosure is sought by private parties engaged in private litigation." 629 
F.2d at 949 (emphasis original). Although the Supreme Court has never decided this question, 
the weight of authority and the Court's rationale in Procter & Gamble and Douglas Oil reject 
this assertion. With one exception (a case decided before the Supreme Court's Procter & Gam-
ble decision) the party seeking disclosure satisfied the ''particularized need" standard in every 
case cited by the Colonial Chevrolet court. See 629 F.2d at 947 n.9. And Colonial Chevrolet 
did not rest its result upon a conclusion that the ''particularized need" standard was generally 
inapplicable to requests by state attorneys general. Instead, it held that§ 4F(b) eliminated the 
need for a demonstration of "particularized need" in this specific context. 629 F.2d at 950. 
59. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979). Although the 
Court placed the burden of demonstrating the balance between the need for grand jury materi-
als and the public interest on the party seeking disclosure, it noted that: "As the considerations 
justifying secrecy become less relevant, a party asserting a need for grand jury transcripts will 
have a lesser burden in showing justification." 441 U.S. at 223. 
60. E.g., United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943, 950 (1980), cert. denied, 
101 S. Ct. 1352 (1981); United States v. Cargo Gasoline Co., (1980-81] Trade Cas. 78,601 
(M.D. Fla. 1980); United States v. Campbell Hardware, Inc., (1979-2] Trade Cas. 78,615 (D. 
Mass. 1979) (basis of state attorney general's request not specified); In re Montgomery County 
Real Estate Antitrust Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 54, 62 (D. Md. 1978). 
In Colonial Chevrolet, the Attorney General of Virginia and the United States appealed 
from denial of a petition for disclosure of grand jury materials pursuant to § 4F(b ). The dis-
trict court had accepted the defendants' nolo contendere pleas in the earlier federal criminal 
antitrust case that had resulted from the grand jury investigation. Virginia sought the materi-
als in order to evaluate the possibilities for such a parens patriae action. The court of appeals 
reversed, holding that§ 4F(b) was an explicit congressional statement of the legitimate and 
_R!oper need of the state attorney general for disclosure of grand jury materials, which relieved 
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Under the Fourth Circuit's approach, courts treat section 4F(b) 
as a congressional directive that they exercise their discretion to dis-
close grand jury materials without a showing of "particularized 
need" whenever the United States has in its possession materials that 
may be relevant to a state's parens patriae suit. These courts recog-
nize that rule 6( e )(2) prohibits disclosure by the Attorney General 
under section 4F(b) absent a court order,61 but they assert that the 
congressional purpose underlying section 4F(b) - to provide state 
attorneys general with all materials relevant to state civil enforce-
ment of federal antitrust laws - "resolved the public interests con-
sideration" that the "particularized need" standard would otherwise 
require.62 This approach would leave the court free to exercise its 
discretion to deny disclosure, but would shift the burden of proof 
from the parties seeking disclosure to those opposing disclosure. 
The Fourth Circuit's approach to disclosure of grand jury materi-
als is troublesome because it rests on a conclusion that Congress in-
tended section 4F(b) to modify the very laws that it incorporated by 
reference to limit the section's scope. Of course, if this Note's finding 
that grand jury materials are not "investigative files or other materi-
als" for section 4F(b) purposes is correct, the section could in no way 
indicate congressional intent to relax the "particularized need" stan-
dard. But, even assuming that grand jury materials fall within sec-
tion 4F(b)'s scope, courts would have to find something in the 
section's language and legislative history to indicate that Congress 
intended section 4F(b) to modify the standards that courts apply 
when evaluating rule 6(e)(3)(C) requests for grand jury materials. 
The evidence suggests a quite different conclusion: Congress in-
tended only to incorporate existing law as a limitation on section 
4F(b)'s disclosure command and did not plan to liberalize rule 
6(e)(3)'s disclosure standards. 
The first problem with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation lies in 
the language of the parens patriae statute. If grand jury proceedings 
are "investigative files or other materials" under section 4F(b), rule 
6(e) is implicated in the section's statutory scheme only by virtue of 
the "to the extent permitted by law" restriction. While acknowledg-
ing that Congress intended this restriction to limit section 4F(b)'s 
disclosure mandate by referring to rule 6(e) and other statutes that 
limit disclosure of Justice Department materials,63 the Fourth Cir-
that official of the burden of establishing "particularized need" as a prerequisite to disclosure. 
629 F.2d at 950. 
61. United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943, 947 (1980), cert. denied, IOI S. 
Ct. 1352· (1981). 
62. United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943, 950 (1980), cert. denied, IOI S. 
Ct. 1352 (1981). 
63. See note 46 supra and accompanying text. 
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cuit claims that section 4F(b) also liberalized the rule 6( e) disclosure 
limitations. Such a claim seems implausible because Congress ad-
dressed section 4F(b) not to the district courts that administer the 
"particularized need" standard, but to the Attorney General. 64 Sec-
tion 4F(b) refers neither to court ordered disclosure nor to judicial 
cooperation with the Attorney General to facilitate civil antitrust 
suits. Nothing in section 4F(b)'s language suggests that district 
courts should cease to apply the "particularized need" standard to 
requests for disclosure by state attorneys general. 
The sparse legislative history also discredits any inference that 
Congress intended section 4F(b) to relax the disclosure requirements 
of other statutes in general, or of rule 6(e)(3)(C) in particular. Sena-
tor Abourezk commented on the Senate floor that "[s]ection 4F(b) 
specifically limits the Attorney General's power to release documents 
to whatever his powers are under existing law ."65 At the time of en-
actment, as now, state attorneys general coulq. obtain grand jury 
materials under rule 6(e)(3)(C) only upon a showing of "particular-
ized need." Both the statutory language and the legislative history, 
therefore, indicate that section 4F(b) left intact the requirement that 
state attorneys general demonstrate "particularized need" before ob-
taining access to federal grand jury materials. 
Several other congressional actions support the conclusion that 
Congress did not intend to modify rule 6(e)'s disclosure limitations. 
First, the Senate version of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, of which sec-
tion 4F(b) was a part, included a section that would have guaranteed 
all civil antitrust plaintiffs access to grand jury materials after com-
pletion of the federal case. 66 Although Congress did not enact this 
provision, it sparked emotional debate. 67 The debate indicated that 
64. The statute merely limits the Attorney General's discretion to refuse to make available 
"investigative files or other materials" that he may lawfully disclose. See notes 46-52 supra 
and accompanying text. 
65. See note 51 supra. 
66. § 202(/) of S. 1284 provided: 
Any person that institutes a civil action under this Act may, upon payment of reasonable 
charges therefore and after completion of any civil or criminal proceeding instituted by 
the United States and arising out of any grand jury proceeding, inspect and copy any 
documentary material, produced in and the transcript of such grand jury proceeding con-
cerning the subject matter of such person's civil action. Any action under this subsection 
shall be brought in the United States district court for the district in which the grand jury 
proceeding occurred. The court may impose conditions upon the grant of access and 
protective orders that are required by the interests of justice. 
S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 110 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. A 
subsequent amendment restricted access to third-party testimony and allowed disclosure of 
corporate officers' and employees' testimony only following guilty or nolo contendere pleas. 
See 122 CONG. REc. 16,922-23 (1976). 
67. The Judiciary Committee's majority report stated: 
§ 202 is a determination by the Committee that, generally, the reasons for grand jury 
secrecy are no longer relevant when . . . a private plaintiff files a motion for leave to 
inspect such grand Jury evidence after the Department jof Justice] has completed any civil 
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in considering the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Congress.was well aware 
of the burdens that the "particularized need" standard imposed on 
civil litigants.68 After upholding the "particularized need" standard 
by rejecting the provision, it is unlikely that Congress would have 
intended section 4F(b) to modify that standard without expressly 
stating so. 69 
Congressional treatment of the disclosure of civil investigative 
demand materials provides a second indication that Congress did 
not intend section 4F(b) to modify rule 6(e)'s disclosure require-
ments. In addition to its parens patriae provisions, the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act contained amendments to the Antitrust Civil Process 
Act that increased the Justice Department's civil investigative de-
mand power.70 Although civil investigative demand materials would 
assist state enforcement of federal antitrust laws, the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act requires strict confidentiality of such materials.71 In so 
doing, it protects the legitimate rights of persons under investiga-
tion, 72 and the interests of witnesses in freedom from retaliation. 73 It 
would be anomalous to interpret section 4F(b) impliedly to liberalize 
rule 6(e)'s disclosure requirements and not to interpret it also to lib-
or criminal case which arose out of the grand jury investigation. The Committee believes 
that disclosure, rather than suppression, of grand jury evidence generally promotes the 
proper and efficient administration of justice. 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 66, at 4. See 122 CONG. REC. 16,992 (1976) (remarks of Sen. 
Morgan). A minority of the Judiciary Committee vehemently attacked its conclusion: 
Without any apparent justification, support from the Department of Justice or any other 
source, or consideration of the adverse impact on criminal law enforcement, sections 
202(k) and (1) abolish in one stroke the long-established policy for maintaining the se-
crecy of grand jury proceedings. Sanctity and secrecy of grand jury proceedings serve an 
important function in antitrust and other law enforcement. 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 66, at 203. See 122 CONG. REc. 17,428 (1976) (remarks of Sen. 
Tower). 
68. Under existing law a private plaintiff must file a motion to inspect the transcripts of 
grand jury testimony and the documents in the district court where the investigation took 
place. The judge has the discretion to grant access upon a showing of "particularized and 
compelling need." 
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 66, at 33; 122 CONG. REc. 15,311-12 (1976) (statement of Sen. 
Hart). 
69. See Note, supra note 4, at 661-62. Although courts should exercise caution in relying 
on changes in a statute during the course of enactment to determine legislative intent, the 
rejection of a specific provision may be significant. See Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 
96 (1935); People for Environmental Progress v. Leisz, 373 F. Supp. 589, 592 (C.D. Cal. 1974). 
Moreover, courts generally do not presume that the common law is changed by the passage of 
a statute that gives no indication that it proposes such a change. If a change is to be made in 
the common law, the legislature must clearly and plainly express its purpose to do so. See 
Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1039-40 (Ct. Cl. 1977); 3 C. SANDS, STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 61.01, at 41-45 (4th ed. 1974). 
70. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1976) (amended 1979). 
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976) (amended 1980). 
72. See H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. Coos 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2602; SENATE REPORT, supra note 66, at 30-1. 
73. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 66, at 204. 
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eralize civil investigative demand restrictions,74 especially since simi-
lar policies underlie secrecy in both cases.75 Yet, such an 
interpretation would be difficult to reconcile with the restrictions on 
disclosure of civil investigative demands contained in the same act as 
section 4F(b).76 It is, therefore, not surprising that Senator 
Abourezk, in discussing section 4F(b)'s "to the extent permitted by 
law'' restriction, stated that the Attorney General "cannot turn over 
materials given in response to a grand jury demand or a civil investi-
gative demand."77 
Liberalized disclosure of grand jury proceedings would also cir-
cumvent the clear intent of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act to guarantee 
secrecy of civil investigative demand materials. Although the disclo-
sure prohibitions of the Antitrust Civil Process Act bar release of 
civil investigative demand materials, 78 the Justice Department may 
74. See, e.g., id. at 204 (minority report): 
There is also a strange inconsistency in the committee's actions. The Justice Department 
insists on keeping its civil investigations secret in order to protect witnesses - employees, 
suppliers, customers - against retaliation by firms or individuals under investigation. It 
even asks for a complete exemption from the Freedom of Information Act for CID mate-
rial, in order to encourage cooperation by persons concerned about confidentiality. While 
the committee accepts these concerns with respect to civil investigations, it ignores them in 
connection with antitrust criminal investigations. 
The committee minority based its criticism on a comparison of the civil investigative demand 
provisions and the committee-endorsed provisions of§ 202(1). See notes 66-67 supra. If Con-
gress had enacted § 202(1) despite the minority's objections, this would imply that Congress 
was aware of the inconsistency but not bothered by it - that it was willing to allow disclosure 
of grand jury materials while keeping civil investigative demand materials secret. However, 
Congress rejected § 202(1), possibly suggesting that it was unwilling to tolerate such inconsis-
tency. 
And although Congress could reasonably have decided to release grand jury proceedings 
but protect the confidentiality of civil investigative demand material, the legislative history 
suggests that it decided otherwise. If Congress intended parens patriae suits to be primarily a 
remedy for price-fixing, Congress could have found disclosure of civil investigative demand 
materials unnecessary to accomplish the objectives of the parens patriae legislation. Se_e Mary-
land Brief, supra note 24, at 9 n.5. However, Congress envisioned the parens patriae titles as a 
remedy for a broad range of antitrust violations. See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976); HousE REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 3, [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2573; 122 CONG. REC. 17,245 
(1976) (remarks of Sen. Bartlett). 
75. The considerations that justify secrecy of civil investigative demand materials, see text 
at notes 72-73 supra, also justify secrecy of grand jury materials. In fact, one of the sponsors of 
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act stressed the similarities between civil antitrust and grand jury in-
vestigations. See 122 CONG. REc. 29,341 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Hart). Contra, 122 CONG. 
REc. 30,884 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Rodino). And whether an alleged violation is investi-
gated civilly or criminally depends upon a potentially arbitrary resolution of a very close ques-
tion. See Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act 
Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 408 (1978). The Justice Department initiates grand 
jury investigations when there is "some reason to believe that a criminal violation may have 
taken place. Such a standard inevitably results in authorization of grand jury investigations 
which in fact lead to civil suits rather than criminal prosecutions." Id. at 413 (emphasis origi-
nal). 
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976) (amended 1980). 
77. See note 51 supra. 
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3) (1976); Scher, Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1976, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 679, 691 (1977). States seeking disclosures of grand jury 
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use these materials in grand jury proceedings.79 One~ materials pass 
into the grand jury's control, document owners and witnesses may be 
unable to ensure secrecy. 80 Liberal disclosure of grand jury proceed-
ings might then result in liberal disclosure .of civil investigative de-
mand materials presented to the grand jury. 
Finally, the 1977 amendment to rule 6( e) indicates that Congress 
did not intend to modify rule 6(e)'s disclosure standard. That 
amendment permits disclosure of grand jury materials to govern-
ment personnel deemed necessary to assist a government attorney in 
the enforcement of the federal criminal law.81 When discussing the 
amendment, Congress specifically indicated that courts should apply 
the "particularized need" standard to federal agency requests for ac-
cess to grand jury materials for use in civil proceedings. 82 Although 
the policies supporting Congress's decision to require that federal 
agencies demonstrate "particularized need" apply with equal force 
to state attorneys general, Congress never mentioned section 4F(b). 
If Congress intended the 1976 enactment of section 4F(b) to modify 
rule 6(e)'s "particularized need" standard and provide priority access 
to state attorneys general, it is difficult to understand why it made no 
reference to that liberalized standard during the debates surrounding 
the enactment of the 1977 amendment to rule 6(e). 
Part II has shown that Congress did not intend to modify rule 
6(e)'s disclosure requirements when it enacted section 4F(b). The 
statute's language and legislative history, as well as other congres-
materials admit that civil investigative demand materials are specifically precluded from dis-
closure, in contrast to grand jury materials. See, e.g., Maryland Brief, supra note 24, at 9. 
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(l) (1976) (amended 1980). 
80. Kintner, Griffin & Goldston, supra note 4, at 8. Once the material passes into the 
control of the grand jury, the documents custodian may have difficulty regaining control. See 
15 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(I) (1976) (amended 1980). 
81. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii). 
82. The Senate Committee specifically indicated its acceptance of United States v. Procter 
& Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), in which the Supreme Court held that grand jury materi-
als may be disclosed only upon a showing of "particularized need." S. REP. No. 354, supra 
note 35, at 8, [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 532. See Fund for Constitutional Govt. 
v. National Archives & Records Serv., 485 F. Supp. I, II (D.D.C. 1978). It is clear that the 
drafters contemplated a showing of "particularized need" prior to civil use of grand jury 
materials by a federal agency. Note, Administrative Agency Access lo Grand Jury Material 
Under Amended Rule 6(e), 29 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 295, 321-23 (1978). See Proposed Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings on R.R. 5864 Before the Subcomm. 
on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., 95tli Cong., 1st Sess. 92-93 (1977) (testi-
mony of Wayne LaFave). The courts have usually required federal agencies to demonstrate 
"particularized•need." See In re Grand Jury, 583 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1978); In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440, 444 (3d Cir. 1962); In re April, 1977 Grand Jury Proceedings, 
506 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. Mich. 1981); SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 87 F.R.D. 100, 104 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 414 F. Supp. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), Contra, 
In re December 1974 Term Grand Jury Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 743, 750 (D. Md. 1978). 
Bui see In re June 20, 1977 Concurrent Grand Jury Investigation, J. Ray McDermott & Co,, 
622 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1980) (suggesting that the question whether a government agency must 
demonstrate "particularized need" may be an open question). 
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sional actions, reveal that Congress intended to incorporate, without 
modification, the disclosure prohibitions of existing laws. In the case 
of grand jury materials, section 4F(b) embraced rule 6(e)'s "particu-
larized need" standard, and courts may, therefore, order disclosure 
to state attorneys general only when satisfied that a "particularized 
need" outweighs the need for secrecy. 
III. SECTION 4F(b) AND THE NEED FOR GRAND JURY SECRECY 
Although the parens patriae statute and its legislative history in-
dicate that Congress never intended section 4F(b) to abrogate or 
modify rule 6(e)'s "particularized need" standard, they are not so 
unambiguous as to prevent courts from looking to the policies· be-
hind them to decide whether disclosure of grand jury materials is 
appropriate.83 This Part, therefore, evaluates the policies that favor 
liberalized disclosure and those that favor grand jury secrecy. It 
finds that while liberalized disclosure would aid state attorneys gen-
eral in the prosecution of civil antitrust suits, it would also decrease 
the grand jury's effectiveness as an investigative tool and harm the 
interests of grand jury witnesses and targets. Balancing these consid-
erations, Part III concludes that Congress properly refrained from 
abrogating or modifying rule 6(e) when it enacted section 4F(b). 
Liberalized disclosure of grand jury materials may to some extent 
further the purpose of the parens patriae provisions, which is to en-
courage state civil enforcement of the antitrust laws. Section 4F(b) 
was designed to promote federal-state cooperation by assisting state 
attorneys general in their enforcement efforts.84 Because rule 6(e)'s 
"particularized need" standard bars disclosure of grand jury materi-
als to expedite discovery, it may be at cross-purposes with the Act: it 
makes discovery more difficult and costly for state attorneys gen-
eral. 85 The task of amassing the voluminous data essential to suc-
cessful antitrust enforcement is of considerable magnitude. 86 
83. Parts I and II recognize that the limited legislative history of§ 4F(b) does not define 
conclusively the scope of the section. See Kintner, Griffin & Goldston, supra note 4, at 1-3. 
84. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 17, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2586. 
Co=entators had been urging greater state involvement in the antitrust enforcement effort 
for decades. Dibble & Jardine, The Utah Antitrust Act of 1979: Getting into the State Antitrust 
Business, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 73, 73. State attorneys general had specifically requested in-
creased access to materials generated by federal investigations. See Antitrust Improvements Act 
Hearings, supra note 9, at 686, 700 (statements of J. Danforth and L. Freeman). 
85. See Reviving State Enforcement, supra note 3, at 662; Section 4F(b), NATL. A. ATTOR-
NEYS GENERAL ANTITRUST REP., Dec. 1980, at 3-5. 
Although the "particularized need" standard delays access to federal grand jury materials, 
it is not clear that it unduly hampers private enforcement efforts. Compare Antitrust Improve-
ments Act Hearings, supra note 9, at 399 (testimony of Mark Silbergeld), with id. at 100 (testi-
mony of Thomas E. Kauper) and Panel Discussion, Government Enforcement and Private 
Actions, 42 ANTITRUST L.J. 208, 219 (1972). 
86. H.R. REP. No. 1343, supra note 72, at 22, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 
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Permitting states to obtain materials generated by a federal grand 
jury would save time and money and thus facilitate state civil suits 
under the federal antitrust laws. 87 
Nevertheless, a number of factors make it unlikely that states will 
abandon valid suits merely because they are unable to expedite dis-
covery with federal grand jury materials. First, state attorneys gen-
eral enjoy access to many sources of information that enable them to 
assess the strength of their cause of action. Prior to instituting a 
parens patriae suit, state attorneys general can use not only the wide 
array of Justice Department materials covered by section 4F(b),88 
but also the pre-complaint discovery powers with which many states 
have endowed them. 89 These powers enable state attorneys general 
to issue broad civil investigative demands without filing an action 
or convening a grand jury and without court approval.90 Though 
grand jury materials would be helpful, these other precomplaint dis-
covery devices should provide enough information to enable state 
attorneys general to determine accurately the strength of their cause 
of action and to develop an effective discovery strategy.91 
Post-complaint discovery procedures also mitigate the burden re-
sulting from rule 6(e)'s "particularized need" standard. Information 
developed in grand jury investigations may become available 
through the civil discovery process.92 TheManualfor Complex Liti-
gation allows parties to submit interrogatories demanding that de-
fendants identify the documents submitted to government agencies 
and the persons who testified before the grand jury.93 This informa-
tion will help state attorneys general obtain the relevant evidence 
originally introduced to the grand jury. State attorneys general can 
2616 Qetter from Edward H. Levi). See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 3, Ex-
PEDITINO PRETRIALS AND TRIALS OF ANTITRUST CASES I (1979). 
81. See Section 4F(b), NATL. A. ATTORNEYS GENERAL ANTITRUST REP., Dec. 1980, at 3. 
Cf. Antitrust Procedural Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 390 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46, SO (1979) (statements 
of Eleanor Fox and Peter M. Gerhart) (arguing that federal government should be permitted 
to discover materials generated in private litigation). 
88. See text at notes 40-43 supra. Access to the Antitrust Division's complaints and indict-
ments should be particularly useful. "Armed with the outline of the government's case as set 
forth in the indictment or complaint, private plaintiffs should have little difficulty in initially 
structuring their discovery in an attempt to build a substantial case." Steinhouse, supra note 
42, at 494. 
89. At least 28 states currently authorize their attorneys general to gather information 
about suspected antitrust violations without filing an action or convening a grand jury, See 
Reviving State E'!forcement, supra note 3, at 620. 
90. Miles, supra note 6, at 1347. 
91. Through civil investigative demands, the attorney general can make sure that he has a 
strong case before filing a complaint. Id. at 1355. 
92. Steinhouse, supra note 42, at 494. 
93. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LmoATION § 2.00(A)(4)-(A)(6) (1978) (Appendix of Materi-
als). 
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also procure certain investigative materials of the Federal Trade 
Commission,94 as well as materials developed in the discovery of 
other private suits.95 And, of course, state attorneys general may ob-
tain grand jury materials as soon as they demonstrate a "particular-
ized need." These post-complaint procedures provide state attorneys 
general with an opportunity not only to obtain materials from other 
investigations, but also to acquire evidence presented to the grand 
jury. It is, therefore, unlikely that state attorneys general will refuse 
to pursue worthy parens patriae suits merely because they cannot ob-
tain grand jury materials to expedite discovery. 
Two additional considerations support the conclusion that state 
attorneys general are unlikely to abandon valid parens patriae ac-
tions because of the limited availability of grand jury materials. 
First, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires a guilty defendant in a 
state parens patriae suit to pay not only treble damages but also the 
reasonable attorneys' fees of the prevailing state.96 This shifts much 
of the cost of enforcement to guilty defendants and should amelio-
rate some of the concern over the additional cost of discovery that 
might result from nondisclosure of grand jury materials.97 Second, 
the public resources available for state actions98 and the political 
popularity of state antitrust enf orcement99 appear to be increasing. 
State attorneys general will, therefore, be unlikely to ignore worthy 
parens patriae suits. 100 
While liberalized disclosure would not significantly increase the 
incentives to bring worthy parens patriae suits, it could substantially 
undermine grand jury secrecy. 101 In this context, grand jury secrecy 
94. See, e.g., Fleming v. FTC, [1980-81] Trade Cas. 77,272 (D.D.C. 1980); Interco, Inc. v. 
FTC, 490 F. Supp. 39 (D.D.C. 1979); Martin Marietta Corp. v. FTC, 475 F. Supp. 338 (D.D.C. 
1979). See generally The FTC Improvement Act, NATL. A. ATTORNEYS GENERAL ANTITRUST 
REP., Dec. 1980, at 2-3. 
95. See, e.g., Wille v. American Medical Assn., [1980-81] Trade Cas. 77,654 (7th Cir. 1980). 
96. 15 u.s.c. § 15c(a)(2) (1976) (amended 1980). See Cases, NATL. A. ATTORNEYS GEN-
ERAL ANTITRUST REP., Dec. 1980, at 5-6. 
97. Cf. Zimmer & Sullivan, Consent .Decree Settlements by Administrative Agencies in Anti-
trust and Employment .Discrimination: Optimizing Public and Private Interests, 1976 DUKE L.J. 
163, 170 n.16 (referring to private actions). 
98. See 122 CONG. R.Ec. 17,245 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Helms); 122 CONG. REC. 17,239 
(1976) (remarks of Sen. Hruska). Contra, Rubin & Malet, supra note 4, at 518. 
99. See Reviving State E,!forcement, supra note 3, at 549. 
100. See [1980] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 992, D-2. The increased costs 
of discovery due to application of the "particularized need" standard may deter frivolous suits. 
See generally Handler & Blechman, supra note 3, at 670; 122 CONG. REc. 17,245 (1976) (re-
marks of Sen. Helms). Courts should consider this potential benefit when assessing the costs 
and benefits of nondisclosure. 
101. A number of commentators have criticized the rule of grand jury secrecy. One has 
suggested that, historically, the policy of secrecy went too far and jurisdictions that adhere to 
traditional rules do so unnecessarily. Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of 
Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REv. 668,669 (1962). Others have argued that dismissal of the grand jury 
and apprehension of the accused ends the need for secrecy. Calkins, The Fading Myth of 
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serves two purposes: it promotes the grand jury's effectiveness as an 
investigative tool and, therefore, increases the effectiveness of anti-
trust enforcement; and it protects the interests of grand jury wit-
nesses and targets. Liberalized disclosure under section 4F(b) would 
frustrate both purposes. 
First, disclosure of grand jury materials to state attorneys general 
without a showing of "particularized need" could significantly re-
duce the effectiveness of grand jury investigations. The Justice De-
partment uses the grand jury as a primary tool in antitrust 
enforcement,102 and the grand jury's effectiveness as an institution is 
important not only to the Antitrust Division, but to state attorneys 
general 103 and private antitrust plaintiffs as well. 104 Secrecy protects 
the grand jury's effectiveness in four ways: it prevents the escape of 
those whose indictment may be contemplated, insures the utmost 
freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations by preventing persons 
Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 18, 20 (1967); Hassett, Ex Parle Pre-Trial 
.Discovery: The Real Vice of Parallel Investigations, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1058 
(1979). Contra, Nitschke, Reflections on Some Evils of the Expanding Use of the Grand Jury 
Transcript, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 198 (1968). 
In response to these criticisms, the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws 
and Procedures considered a number of proposals to facilitate access to grand jury materials. 
Among these were modification of rule 6, release of grand jury materials pursuant to protective 
orders, release of testimony with limitations on use, release of"sanitized" grand jury materials 
for the development of discovery leads and release pursuant to Justice Department guidelines. 
Previously .Discovered Material, supra note 9, at 1091-92. The Commission did not recom-
mend adoption of any of these proposals. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTI• 
TRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
50-51 (1979). A minority of the Commissioners argued that secrecy was unjustified after re-
turn of an indictment. These Commissioners would recommend amending rule 6(e) to require 
the burden on the government to demonstrate a "particularized need" for preserving secrecy in 
antitrust cases. Id. at 51. 
In recent years, courts have begun to consider whether the policies underlying secrecy ap-
ply in a particular case. A number oflower federal courts, following the lead of United States 
Indus., Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 345 F.2d 18 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965), 
hold that "if the reasons for maintaining secrecy do not apply at all in a given situation or 
apply to only an insignificant degree, the party seeking disclosure should not be required to 
demonstrate a large compelling need." 345 F.2d at 21. See United States v. Moten, 542 F.2d 
654 (2d Cir. 1978); Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889 
(1977); In re Cement-Concrete Block, Chicago Area, Grand Jury Proceedings, 381 F. Supp. 
1108 (N.D. Ill. 1974). Nevertheless, there still exists in civil cases and in cases in which disclo-
sure is not provided as a matter of right, see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(A); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3500(e)(3) (1976), a requirement that the party seeking disclosure demonstrate a level of need 
commensurate with the degree of secrecy remaining and the policy reasons that justify protect-
ing that secrecy. Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d at 774. 
102. See Mahaffie, supra note 42, at 523; Silbert, .Defense Counsel in the Grand Jury- The 
Answer to the While Collar Criminal's Prayers, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 293, 293 (1978). 
103. If increased disclosure through§ 4F(b) inhibits future grand jury testimony, state at• 
tomeys general could eventually be harmed by increased access to grand jury materials. If 
federal criminal suits never get off the ground because of the reticence of grand jury witnesses, 
the useful materials that the Justice Department would have developed to prosecute the suits, 
see notes 40-43 supra, will never be assembled, and states will no longer receive them through 
§ 4F(b) requests. 
104. See notes 8-9 supra. 
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subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand 
jurors, deters perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may tes-
tify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those in-
dicted by it, and encourages free and untrammeled disclosure by 
persons who have information with respect to the commission of 
crimes.105 The first three concerns are relevant only during the 
course of the grand jury proceedings or the criminal cases arising out 
of the investigation.106 When state attorneys general request grand 
jury materials before criminal proceedings have ended, these three 
factors weigh heavily in favor of secrecy .107 Most requests for disclo-
sure, however, will come after termination of the grand jury investi-
gation 108 and any federal criminal prosecution.109 -The discussion 
below, therefore, considers the effect of liberalized disclosure of 
grand jury materials on persons who have information about anti-
trust violations. 
Grand juries cannot operate effectively unless witnesses are unin-
hibited in disclosing information about crimes.110 Witnesses will 
make full disclosure only when they do not fear that retribution or 
105. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10 (1979); United 
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958); United States v. Amazon 
Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931). A number of co=entators question the 
relevance of these policies. See note 101 supra. The courts also find that grand jury secrecy 
protects the innocent accused from stigma and spurious suits, and witnesses from retaliation. 
See notes 132-44 infra and accompanying text. A recent General Accounting Office report 
underscored the reality of these concerns. The report accused the Justice Department and the 
federal courts of failing to protect grand jury secrecy. The GAO said that disclosures had 
damaged the reputations of persons never indicted, delayed other investigations, and caused 
some grand jury targets to flee. See NATL. LJ., Nov. 17, 1980, at 3, col. I. 
106. See 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at § 106; Note, Texas v. United States Steel Corp. 
and Illinois v. Sarbaugh: 'I7ze .Disclosure and Use ef Grand Jury Transcripts in Private Antitrust 
Litigation, 9 LOY. Cm. LJ. 984, 987 (1978). 
107. Although the cases to date have not presented the issue, it is conceivable that a state 
attorney general might request materials produced by an ongoing grand jury investigation or 
submit a request for disclosure prior to completion of the federal criminal case arising out of 
the investigation. Such a request would implicate all four of the concerns outlined in the text, 
as well as interests of the innocent accused and witnesses. See note 105 supra; Brief for the 
United States at 14-15, United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1352 (1981). The government argues that a district court should 
deny a state request while the grand jury is sitting or while trial is in progress or pending. Id. 
at 15. 
108. Because courts must consider the effects of disclosure on the functioning of future 
grand juries, the need to limit disclosure remains after the grand jury under consideration has 
completed its term. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979). 
109. As a practical matter, the Justice Department may be able to exert some control over 
when requests will be made by delaying notification under § 4F{a). 15 U.S.C. § 15f(a) (1976) 
(amended 1980). 
110. United States v. Scott Paper Co., 254 F. Supp. 759, 761 (W.D. Mich. 1966). Indeed, 
one court claims that the "willingness of a witness to speak openly without fear must not be 
subordinated to any policy if the Grand Jury system is to function." Philadelphia v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 486, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Accord, Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol 
Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1979). 
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social stigma will result from their testimony. 111 Grand jury secrecy 
secures free and untrammeled testimony by protecting witnesses 
from such retaliation;112 rule 6(e)(3)(C) assures witnesses that their 
testimony will not be disclosed absent a showing of "particularized 
need." 
Liberalized disclosure threatens the effectiveness of grand jury 
investigations by increasing the likelihood of retaliation against wit-
nesses. Persons called to testify before a grand jury assess the 
chances that outside parties will obtain their testimony and take ac-
tions against them. Faced with increased prospects of disclosure and 
retaliation, witnesses who would otherwise fully assist the grand jury 
may offer what one Senator has labeled "minimum feasible coopera-
tion." 113 Unhappy with the choice between retaliation and a con-
tempt charge for not cooperating, witnesses may choose to provide 
just enough information to avoid a contempt citation. 114 Such reti-
cence may irreparably damage the antitrust grand jury's effective-
ness and cripple antitrust enforcement efforts. 115 
111. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211,222 (1979). 
112. Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., [1978-1) Trade Cas. 74,369, 74,376 (E.D. 
Ark. 1978). 
113. See 122 CONG. REc. 17,430-31 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Tower). 
114. Id. See also Baker,Antitrust in the Sunshine, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 347, 352-53 (1977). 
115. A number of commentators argue that disclosure does not endanger the public inter-
est in free and untrammeled disclosure. They assert that because grand jury witnesses must 
expect to testify at trial, disclosure of grand jury materials will cause no additional fear of 
retaliation or embarrassment. 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at§ 106, pp. 170-77 (1969); Cal-
kins, supra note 101, at 21; Calkins, supra note 11, at 461; Knudsen, Pretrial JJisclosure of 
Federal Grand Ju,y Testimony, 48 WASH. L. REv. 423, 444-46 (1973); JJevelopments in the Law 
- JJiscove,y, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940, 1013-14 (1961); Recent Decisions, Civil Procedure -
JJisclosure of Minutes When Grand Ju,y Was Used for Purpose of Preparing/or Civil A ct ion, 59 
MICH. L. REv. 123, 125 (1960). Contra, Unikel, supra note 7, at 709-10; Recent Developments, 
Government's Continued Use of Grand Ju,y ofter JJecision not to Seek Indictment Held an Abuse 
Warranting Wholesale JJiscove,y of Improper Proceedings in Subsequent Civil Action, 59 
COLUM. L. REv. 1089 (1959). 
But none of these authors addressed the unique features of antitrust litigation; only Knud-
sen empirically studied the effect of disclosure on witnesses' reluctance to testify, and his re-
sults were inconclusive. See Knudsen, supra, at 444-45. Of course, if a witness knew with 
certainty that he would be required to testify at trial and would give identical testimony before 
the grand jury and in court, disclosure of grand jury testimony would not increase the fear of 
retaliation. A witness may, however, be less guarded in his testimony concerning his personal 
business relations before a grand jury than he would be at trial. See Note, Release of Grand 
Jury Minutes in the National JJeposition Program of the Electrical Equipment Cases, 112 U. PA, 
L. REv. 1133, 1141 (1964). And in fact, few antitrust grand jury witnesses testify at trial. 
Although government attorneys inform witnesses that testimony given to the grand jury may 
also have to be given at trial, see Knudsen, supra, at 444, less than half of all antitrust grand 
juries return indictments, [1979) ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 943, Dec. 13, 
1979, at A-7, and if an indictment results, nolo contendere pleas terminate most criminal anti-
trust cases. Lynch, Three lJ!lferences Between Criminal and Civil Pretrial Options in Antitrust 
Cases, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 682, 684 (1977). In both instances, the witnesses do not testify in 
court. The experience of grand juries generally, upon which the commentators relied, is sim-
ply not relevant to antitrust grand juries. In 1976, for example, federal grand juries returned 
approximately 23,000 indictments and reported only 123 no true bills. Grand Ju,y Reform 
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Disclosing grand jury material to state attorneys general will in-
crease disclosure to potential retaliators in three ways. First, the 
state attorney general may use the materials in discovery and at trial, 
where they would become public. 116 Second, civil defendants may 
obtain otherwise unavailable grand jury materials through the dis-
covery process. Grand jury materials relevant to a state's parens 
patriae suit will also be relevant to the defense, and may be discover-
able from the state under the liberal discovery provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.117 By requesting grand jury materials 
directly from the state attorney general under the less restrictive civil 
rules, 118 potential retaliators may obtain access even though they are 
unable to demonstrate a "particularized need." 119 Third, release of 
grand jury transcripts to state attorneys general may itself constitute 
a "particularized need" for disclosure to the civil defendant, 120 
Hearings, supra note 11, at 738 (testimony of Benjamin R. Civiletti, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral). 
Similarly, grand jury witnesses do not testify publicly in most civil cases brought by the 
government because they terminate through consent decrees. See HANDBOOK, supra note 18, 
at 42; Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. L. & ECON. 365, 375 (1970). 
Moreover, prosecutors may promise a witness that he will not have to testify at trial. Note, 
Civil J)iscovery of J)ocuments Held by a Grand Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 604, 618 n.53 (1980). 
Because the current likelihood tliat an antitrust grand jury witness will testify at trial is low, it 
is only through disclosure of transcripts that retaliation is made possible. 
In addition, grand jury transcripts may provoke more reprisals than trial testimony. Grand 
jury witnesses are denied both the assistance of counsel in the grand jury room, see In re 
Graban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957), and the traditional evidentiary and procedural safeguards 
designed to secure the truth. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (sanc-
tioning use of inadequate and incompetent evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's 
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination); United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971 
(6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (no right to cross examine witnesses). See 
generally Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing To 
Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1980). Under these circum-
stances, grand jury witnesses are more likely to make irrelevant accusations and give answers 
that are incomplete or require substantial qualification. Nitschke, supra note 101, at 198-99, 
205. 
116. See, e.g., United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., [1978-2] Trade Cas. 76,316 (N.D. Cal. 
1978). 
117. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); Colonial Appellant's Brief, supra note 38, at 13 n.4. 
I 18. States may object to such discovery on the ground that the grand jury material is 
privileged and not discoverable. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). However, the district court in B.F. 
Goodrick explicitly authorized the state to disclose the names and testimony of grand jury 
witnesses in the course of discovery, provided that such disclosure is subject to a protective 
order or stipulation between counsel ensuring its confidentiality. United States v. B.F. Good-
rich Co., [1978-2] Trade Cas. 76,316 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
I 19. Consider, for example, a criminal defendant whose request for disclosure of grand 
jury materials has been denied for failure to demonstrate "particularized need." Pursuant to 
§ 4F(b), a state attorney general bringing a civil action against the same defendant obtains 
disclosure without showing need. The defendant could then seek discovery from the state 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. q. Connecticut v. General Motors Corp., [1974-
2] Trade Cas. 97,079, 97,080-81 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (plaintiff may discover grand jury transcripts 
in defendant's hands under rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on showing of 
relevance rather than "particularized need"). 
120. q. note 56 supra (citing cases that stressed the unfairness of permitting one side to 
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breathing new life into a potential retaliator's rule 6(e) request for 
access to previously secret grand jury transcripts. 
Arguably, courts could remove the threat of retaliation and the 
chilling effect on grand jury testimony that accompanies it by enter-
ing a protective order.121 Such orders could conceivably reassure 
witnesses that they will not face retaliation for their testimony. But 
courts have not issued protective orders 9rohibiting attorneys gen-
eral from disclosing grand jury materials m the discovery process.122 
They may believe that such orders would unfairly grant state attor-
neys general access to large quantities of relevant information while 
denying access to civil defendants. Even if a court initially issued a 
protective order upon disclosing grand jury materials to a state attor-
ney general, the unfairness of permitting one side "to have exclusive 
access to a storehouse of relevant fact" 123 will likely result in the 
court allowing the civil defendant to obtain such materials at some 
later time during discovery or at trial. 124 Protective orders are thus 
an inadequate means to prevent potential retaliators from gaining 
access to grand jury materials. 
Not only would liberalized disclosure to state attorneys general 
increase the chances that retaliators will obtain grand jury materials, 
but it would do so in a context where retaliation is especially likely 
to occur. 125 The Justice Department seeks the testimony of past or 
present corporate employees126 who can shed light on the corpora-
tion's activities in almost every antitrust investigation.127 Corporate 
employees subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury generally fear 
have exclusive access to a storehouse of relevant facts and allowed disclosure to civil plaintiffs 
of grand jury materials in hands of civil defendants). 
121. See United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943, 951 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 101 S. Ct. 1352 (1981); Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 775 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 889 (1977); GrandJuryRefarmHearings,supra note 11, at 339 (testimony of William 
F. Hyland & Robert J. Del Tufo). Bui see SENATE REPORT, supra note 66, at 204 (minority 
views). 
122. E.g., United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., [1978-2] Trade Cas. 76,316 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
123. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 873 (1966) (footnote omitted). See note 15 
supra. 
124. See notes 117-20 supra. Denial of access would be inconsistent with the basic princi-
ples of our civil discovery rules. ''The basic philosophy of the present federal procedure is that 
prior to trial every party to a civil action is entitled to the disclosure of all relevant information 
in the possession of any person, unless the information is privileged." C. WRIGHT & A. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (1970). The Supreme Court has ob-
served that "[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to 
proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he 
has in his possession." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
125. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979); United 
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958); In re Cement-Concrete Block, 
Chicago Area, Grand Jury Proceedings, 381 F. Supp. 1108, 1110-11 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Baker, 
supra note 114, at 351-53 (effect of FOIA). 
126. J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 40, at§ 91.08[5]. 
127. Id. at§ 95.01[3][a]. 
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retaliation from their corporate employer and other members of the 
industry.128 Furthermore, the Justice Department will often sub-
poena the customers, competitors, and suppliers of potential defend-
ants.129 These groups may also be subject to economic retaliation by 
corporate defendants if their testimony becomes available. Thus, 
liberalized disclosure to state attorneys general would make access to 
grand jury materials easier in an area where retaliation is likely to 
occur and is easy to accomplish.130 Aware of this, antitrust grand 
jury witnesses would be hesitant to testify about potential retaliators. 
Absent such testimony, the effectiveness of the antitrust grand jury 
would decline, undermining antitrust enforcement.131 
128. Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., (1978-1) Trade Cas. 76,369, 74,376 (E.D. 
Ark. 1978). A court may permit a corporate defendant in a criminal case to discover the 
relevant grand jury testimony of certain corporate employees. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 
16(a)(l)(A). The rule provides, in relevant part: 
Where the defendant is a corporation, partnership, association or labor union, the court 
may grant the defendant, upon its motion, discovery of relevant recorded testimony of 
any witness before a grand Jury who (1) was, at the time of his testimony, so situated as 
an officer or employee as to have been able legally to bind the defendant in respect to 
conduct constituting the offense, or (2) was, at the time of the offense, personally involved 
in the alleged conduct constituting the offense and so situated as an officer or employee as 
to have been able legally to bind the defendant in respect to that alleged conduct in which 
he was involved. 
Once the employer has the transcript of these witnesses' testimony, all that remains of the 
retaliation justification for secrecy is the need to protect the witness against potential adverse 
effects on his future relationships with members of the industry other than his employer. See 
Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 775 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889 (1977) (the court 
concluded that such interests could be dealt with by a protective order); Texas v. United States 
Steel Corp., 546 F.2d at 626, 630 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889 (1977). The possibility 
that disclosure of this grand jury testimony to state attorneys general will cause retaliation is, 
therefore, reduced. 
Recent cases suggest that the availability of grand jury testimony of certain corporate em-
ployees to corporate defendants under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure may be irrele-
vant to an evaluation of liberalized disclosure of grand jury materials. These cases hold that a 
civil defendant's access to grand jury material under rule l6(a)(l)(A) provides civil plaintiffs 
with "particularized need" for disclosure. See note 56 supra. This trend has been criticized. 
Allowing automatic discovery in civil proceedings as a consequence of discovery by corporate 
criminal defendants may ''restrict unduly the corporation's use of the criminal defense tool 
which Congress saw fit to grant in Fed. R. Crim. P. l6(a)(l)(A)." Texas v. United States Steel 
Corp., 546 F.2d at 630. See Hancock Bros., Inc. v. Jones, 293 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (N.D. Cal. 
1968). If corporate access satisfies the "particularized need" standard, resort to § 4F(b) to 
liberalize that standard would be unnecessary. And, if state attorneys general can demonstrate 
"particularized need" in cases where corporate defendants have obtained access, the liberaliza-
tion of disclosure standards would produce a different result from the rule 6(e) standard only 
in cases where the defendant had been unable to obtain access to the grand jury materials and 
the need for secrecy to prevent retaliation remains high. 
129. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). 
130. Courts traditionally have recognized that the nature of the relationship between wit-
nesses and potential defendants affords effective avenues of retaliation and have restricted 
disclosure for that reason. See, e.g., Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 
222 (1979); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 (1958); Little Rock 
School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., [1978-1) Trade Cas. 76,369, 74,374 (E.D. Ark. 1978). 
131. Liberalized disclosure will also discourage nolo contendere pleas and impair the gov-
ernment's consent decree procedure. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 42, at 251 (statement 
of Ira Millstein). Nolo contendere pleas and consent judgments not only avoid the Clayton 
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Increased disclosure of grand jury materials would not harm an-
titrust enforcement alone. Secrecy protects not only the grand jury's 
effectiveness, but also the interests of witnesses and investigated par-
ties. Because grand jury witnesses are not afforded the assistance of 
counsel or traditional evidentiary and procedural safeguards, there is 
a societal interest in protecting witnesses who testify candidly and 
fully from subsequent retribution and social stigma. 132 As previ-
ously discussed, liberalized disclosure of grand jury materials to state 
attorneys general increases the likelihood of economic retaliation 
against antitrust grand jury witnesses by the targets of the investiga-
tion and other industry members. 133 Disclosing grand jury materials 
to state attorneys general without a showing of "particularized need" 
will, therefore, increase the likelihood of injury to grand jury wit-
nesses. 
Liberalized disclosure to state attorneys general would also injure 
innocent parties accused of crimes by prosecutors during an investi-
gation, as well as defendants indicted by the grand jury. Most courts 
have held that if the grand jury returns no indictment, the need to 
protect the innocent accused justifies secrecy.134 Secrecy, according 
Act's prima facie evidence rule, see 15 U.S.C.A. § 16(a) (1980), but also prevent the introduc-
tion of grand jury testimony into the public record. Civil plaintiffs seeking grand jury materi-
als following a nolo contendere plea must show "particularized need," see Douglas Oil Co, v. 
Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979), and grand jury testimony included in a 
presentence report remains protected by rule 6(e). See Hancock Bros., Inc. v. Jones, 293 F. 
Supp. 1229 (N.D. Cal. 1968). In fact, the court may strike grand jury testimony from the 
presentence report entirely. See United States v. Hogan, 489 F. Supp. 1035 (W.D. Wash. 
1980). Allowing state attorneys general to obtain grand jury materials without a showing of 
"particularized need" will reduce the incentive to enter these types of judgments. See Antitrust 
Improvements Act Hearings,supra note 9, at 84,301 (1975) (statements of Thomas E. Kauper 
and Milton Handler); Handler,Antitrust-Myth and Reality in an Inflationary Era, 50 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 211, 246-47 (1975). Contra,Antitrust Improvements Act Hearings, supra note 9, at 150 
(statement of Ralph Nader and Mark Green). 
132. See, e.g., In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Atlantic 
Container Line, Ltd., [1981-1] Trade Cas. 75,521 (D.D.C. 1981). 
133. See notes 125-30 supra and accompanying text. 
134. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, April, 1978, 581 F.2d 1103, 1110 (4th Cir. 
1978); Application of Jordan, 439 F. Supp. 199, 202 (S.D.W. Va. 1977). 
The recent Ninth and Fourth Circuit decisions directly conflict in their treatment of the 
interests of the innocent accused. United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 619 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 
1980), authorized disclosure only if the grand jury returned no indictments or if the criminal 
case arising out of an indictment had been terminated. 619 F.2d at 801. United States v. 
Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1352 (1981), on 
the other hand, concluded that the public interest and fundamental fairness preclude disclo-
sure if the grand jury returned no indictments. 629 F.2d at 949-50. Neither limitation seems 
logically consistent with the courts' interpretation of the ''to the extent permitted by law" 
clause; if rule 6(e) does not "specifically prohibit" disclosure when the grand jury returned no 
indictments (or returned an indictment), it is difficult to see how the rule "specifically prohib-
its" disclosure when the grand jury reached the opposite conclusion. Although Colonial Chev-
rolet affords greater protection to the innocent accused than does B.F. Goodrich, its approach 
may lead to anomolous results. The return of an indictment does not guarantee that no "inno-
cent accused" interest remains. Indictment of one person investigated by the grand jury does 
not eliminate the need to protect another person who was investigated but not indicted. Simi-
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to the Supreme Court, protects an "innocent accused who is exoner-
ated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, 
and from the expense of standing trial where there was no 
probability of guilt."135 Of course, even if the grand jury indicts 
some of the potential defendants, 136 the innocent accused neverthe-
less retain their interest in secrecy.137 Moreover, even indicted indi-
viduals and corporations have secrecy interests. The grand jury may 
have investigated a broad range of allegations and returned indict-
ments on only a few. 138 Disclosure of these allegations may embar-
rass the person who was investigated, force him to defend against 
these charges in a civil suit, 139 or generally prejudice his case. For 
these reasons, the Supreme Court in Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops 
Northwest held that civil defendants who were indicted and pleaded 
nolo contendere in a prior federal criminal antitrust action neverthe-
less are legally entitled to protection against disclosure of grand jury 
materials. 140 Because the grand jury may have considered accusa-
tions on which it returned no indictment, the Court found disclosure 
appropriate only upon a showing of "particularized need."141 Liber-
alized disclosure to state attorneys general of information regarding 
activities for which no indictment was returned thus threatens the 
interests of both the innocent accused and indicted parties by sub-
jecting them to social stigma and spurious law suits. 
Finally, liberalized disclosure of grand jury materials under-
mines the interests of civil defendants. Grand jury testimony is the 
lady, an indicted defendant may be an "innocent accused" with respect to allegations on 
which the grand jury returned no indictment. 
135. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10 (1979) (quoting 
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958)). 
136. For example, the grand jury whose materials were sought by the Virginia Attorney 
General in Colonial Chevrolet had not indicted many of the firms it investigated. See Brief for 
Appellees, Certain Unindicted Individuals and Corporations at 7-8, United States v. Colonial 
Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1352 (1981). 
137. Even if some indictments are returned, the"grand jury transcript may still contain 
adverse testimony about unindicted individuals and corporations. Illinois Petition v. Widmar, 
[1980-81) Trade Cas. 78,103, 78,108 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
138. The grand jury's inquiry is largely unrestrained by relevancy limitations. See U.S. 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GRAND JURY PRACTICE MANUAL 35 (1975); Nitschke, supra 
note 101, at 204; Note, Administrative Agency Access to Grand Jury Materials, 15 COLUM. L. 
R.Ev. 162, 168 n.43 (1975). 
139. See generally Handler & Blechman, supra note 3, at 670. Handler & Blechman sug-
gest that granting the states power to bringparens patriae suits for consumers will create pres-
sures on state officials to sue in every colorable case, however questionable the legal or 
economic rationale for bringing suit might be. Moreover, state attorneys general may well 
decide that including more counts against known defendants and expanding the total number 
of defendants will improve the chances for a favorable settlement. See generally Austin, Nega-
tive Effects of Treble Damage Actions: Reflections on the New Antitrust Strategy, 1978 DUKE 
LJ. 1353. 
140. 441 U.S. 211, 218 n.8 (1979). 
141. 441 U.S. at 222 n.12. 
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product of a one-sided interrogation by the prosecutor; neither the 
witnesses nor the targets are represented by counsel, and there are 
virtually no restraints on the form or content of questioning. 142 For 
this reason, grand jury transcripts often contain incomplete answers, 
irrelevant accusations, and untrue statements.143 The use of such in-
formation at trial weakens these defendants' rights to the traditional 
procedural and evidentiary safeguards designed to ensure accurate 
factfinding. 144 
In summary, liberalized disclosure of grand jury materials to 
state attorneys general would undermine the interests of the innocent 
accused, indicted parties, and grand jury witnesses. Moreover, dis-
closure in the absence of a "particularized need" would reduce the 
effectiveness of the grand jury and, therefore, the effectiveness of the 
overall antitrust enforcement effort. These concerns weigh heavily 
in favor of grand jury secrecy. And although liberalized disclosure 
would make discovery easier and in some cases less costly for state 
attorneys general pursuingparens patriae suits, a number of factors 
make it unlikely that states will abandon valid suits merely because 
they fail to obtain federal grand jury materials. Balancing the poli-
cies served by liberalized disclosure against those furthered by grand 
jury secrecy, the scale tips in favor of secrecy. 
CONCLUSION 
The apparent conflict between the commands of section 4F(b) 
and rule 6(e) is illusory. As this Note has shown, Congress never 
intended section 4F(b) to authorize the Attorney General to disclose 
grand jury materials to state attorneys general or to modify rule 
6(e)'s traditional disclosure requirements. Instead, Congress struck 
the proper balance between policies underlying grand jury secrecy 
142. See Grand Jury Reform Hearings, supra note 11, at 656 (testimony of Leon Friedman); 
Hixson, Bringing .Down the Curtain on the Absurd .Drama of Entrances and Exits - Witness 
Representation in the Grand Jury Room, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 309 (1978); Mcinerney, 
.Discovery and Use of Grand Jury Minutes, in 1966 ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 92, 101 (N.Y. St, 
B.A.); Note, Federal Grand Juries: The Plight of the Target Witness, 11 U.S.F. L. REV. 672, 675 
(1977). Under the circumstances, grand jury transcripts ''will reflect an inability of the witness 
and the defendant to protect themselves, not just substantively, not just factually, but particu-
larly against the foibles of human recollection and the tricks of cross-examination which may 
be used." Lynch, supra note 115, at 683. 
143. See Nitschke, supra note 101, at 205-06. 
144. Id. at 198-99. The circumstances under which grand jury witnesses testify are particu-
larly significant because this testimony may be used for impeachment purposes, see FED, R. 
Evm. 607, 80l(d); McCiatchey,.Defanding Criminal Antitrust Investigations, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 
527, 531 (1972), and as substantive evidence. See FED. R. Evm. 80l(d), 804(b)(5); United 
States v. Gamer, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978); Note, Evidence-Hearsay-Applicability of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) to Grand Jury Testimony- United States v. Garner, 15 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 416, 429-30 (1979). 
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and federal assistance of state antitrust enforcement by leaving intact 
the requirement that state attorneys general demonstrate "particular-
ized need" before obtaining federal grand jury materials. 
